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CASE NO. f.U- :Jv../) ! I - 31 ? 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
SUSAN E. WJEBE 
District Judge 
1. Petitioner, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina is presently incarcerated in the Northwest 
Detention Facility in Tacoma, Washington in the custody of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement ("ICE") pending removal from the United States to Mexico. 
2. On June 16, 1997, the District Court for the Third Judicial District in the State of 
Idaho, Payette County, the Honorable Stephen Drescher presiding ("district court") entered an 
amended judgment of conviction and commitment and order of probation decreeing that Mr. 
I • VERIFIED PETrrION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
ORlGlNAL 
Mar 23 2011 2:25PM Nevin, Benjamin, y, 8 208345827 4 
r 
Medina was guilty of Delivery of a Controlled Substance in violation of I.C. § 37-2732 in Payette 
County District Court. The number for that case is CR-FE-1996-555 (the "delivery case"). 
3. On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Medina to a unified term of five 
years with a minimum period of confinement of two and one half years. The district court 
suspended Mr. Medina's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five years. As a 
condition of probation, the district court imposed 360 days of jail, ordered that 180 of those days 
be served at the discretion of the probation officer and gave Mr. Medina credit for 97 days 
already served. The district court ordered that Mr. Medina could complete the remaining days in 
the work release program. 
4. The district court adjudged Mr. Medina guilty after an Alford nlea entered on .... --- - ,,- - .... - ~ -- - --- ~- -- - --
April 15, 1997. 
5. Mr. Medina did not appeal his judgment of conviction. 
6. On August 11, 1997, Mr. Medina filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 asking that his jail sentence be commuted to time-served as INS had placed a hold on him and 
he was unable to participate in the work release program as anticipated. The district court 
granted this motion on August 17, 1997. 
7. Mr. Medina has not fi1ed any petitions for habeas corpus in state or federal court 
or any other petitions, motions or applications in this or any other court with respect to this 
judgment of conviction. 
II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
8. Mr. Medina married Maria de Ia Luz ("Luz") in 1986. The couple has four 
children ranging in ages from eleven to twenty-four years of age; The couple's oldest son, 
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Ernesto Junior ("Junior'') and their youngest son. Ulisses, are legal permenent residents of the 
United States. Mr. Medina's two middle children - Yesenia and Albert-· are United States 
citizens. 
9. Mr. Medina- a citizen of Mexico - lawfully entered the United States as a worker 
in 1986. In December 1990, Mr. Medina became a legal permanent resident and was given a 
green card that expired in 2001. A true and correct copy of Mr. Medina's· green card is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
10. Since arriving in the United States, Mr. Medina and his family resided in the 
Ontario, Oregon area. Mr. Medina's oldest three children graduated from local high schools and 
his youngest son is presently enrolled in a local school The older children remain in the area. 
Junior and Yesenia are attending college and Albert has given Mr. Medina a grandchild. 
11. In June 1995, Mr. Medina was arrested and accused of delivery of a controlled 
substance. Mr. Medina neither possessed the drugs at issue nor delivered them. The Payette 
County case number assigned to that case was CR-1995-444. 
12. Luz suffers from a psychotic disorder. Stress exacerbates the symptoms of Luz's 
illness and she reacted very poorly to Ernesto's incarceration. On August 23, 1995, Luz was 
hospitalized for her mental illness. True and correct copies of Luz• s mental health records are 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
13. In September 1995, case nwnber CR-1995-444 was dismissed. 
14. In March 1996, the delivery case was filed based on the same allegation that was 
at issue in the dismissed case, CR-1995-444. Mr. Medina was arrested in the delivery case in 
August 1996. 
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15. Mr. Medina was represented in the delivery case by Mr. David Lee Posey. 
16. Following Mr. Medina's arrest in the delivery case, Luz again had a great deal of 
difficulty coping with Mr. Medina's incarceration. Mr. Medina desperately wanted out of jail so 
that he could continue working and caring for his wife and children. Mr. Medina posted a bail 
bond on November 13, 1996. 
17. After being released from jail, Luz continued to worry that Mr. Medina would 
have to return to jail, which caused her anxiety and depression. 
l &. As important as it was to remain out of jail, it was even more critical for Mr. 
Medina to keep his green card so he could continue living in the area and ca.ring for his family. 
Mr. Medina was very proud of the fact that he had no criminal history and he believed 
maintaining a clean record was important to his immigration status. Therefore, on three 
occasions, Mr. Medina asked Mr. Posey if accepting a plea agreement would effect his 
immigration status. On each occasion~ Mr. Posey assured Mr. Medina that the plea agreement 
and sentence would not effect his green card and that he could remove the conviction from his 
record after 3 months. 
19. Mr. Medina entered a written plea agreement with the state whereby he would 
enter an Alford plea to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. Pursuant to the Alford 
plea, Mr. Medina did not admit guilt but agreed there was evidence upon which a jury could find 
him guilty of the crime. The agreement indicated that Mr. Medina would be placed on probation 
for a period of five years and that as a condition of probation, he serve 360 days of jail. The 
agreement indicated that 180 of those days would be suspended and serv~ at the discretion of 
the probation officer. The agreement further provided that Mr. Medina would receive credit for 
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97 days already served and that the remaining 83 days would be served with work privileges. 
The executed plea agreement was filed with the district court on April 11, 1997. 
20. Mr. Medina relied on Mr. Posey's advice that the plea agreement would not effect 
his immigration status in deciding to enter that agreement. Maintaining his immigration status 
was more important to Mr. Medina than the length of any incarceration or other punishment 
associated with the conviction. Had Mr. Medina known that the plea agreement would subject 
him to deportation, he would not have entered it or negotiated a plea agreement that ameliorated 
the immigration consequences. 
21. The district court accepted Mr. Medina's Alford plea pursuant to this agreement 
on April 15, 1997. 
22. On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Mr. Medina in accordance with the 
plea agreement. The district court ordered Mr. Medina to report for his jail time on July 8, 1997 
and to complete all rehabilitative programs required by his probation officer. 
23. It was the understanding of the district court and the parties that Mr. Medina 
would participate in work release, participate in rehabilitative programs and complete probation 
while residing in Oregon. 
24. On July 25, 1997, Mr. Medina was served with a notice to appear issued by INS 
that alleged he was subject to removal from the United States based on the conviction in the 
delivery case. A true and correct copy of this notice is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
25. On November 19, 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico via Nogales on foot. 
A true and correct copy of the order and notice ofremoval is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Mr. 
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Medina was very confused by the immigration proceedings and did not have a clear 
understanding of their outcome. 
26. INS left Mr. Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated it expired in 
2001. Because INS did not take the green card from Mr. Medina, he believed it must still be 
effective. Mr. Medina presented the green card at the border when he returned to the United 
States and was allowed to enter. 
27. In 2000, Mr. Medina begin to suspect the green card was no longer good and he 
was afraid to apply to renew it. However, Mr. Medina still did not clearly understand the 
outcome of the 1997 immigration proceedings or the impact of the conviction in the delivery case 
on his ability to renew his green card, 
28. In September 201 O~ ICE arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United States 
unlawfully. Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon charged Mr. 
Medina with Reentry of Deported Alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § l326(a), a felony. The case 
was called: USA v. Medina-Gutierrez~ 3:1 O-cr-00389-MA (the ''re-entry case"). 
29. Mr. Medina pled guilty to Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by 
Immigration Officers, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 167 days of incarceration. Mr. 
Medina served that sentence in the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Oregon, 
which was completed on or about March 11, 2011. Mr. Medina is presently in ICE's custody in 
Tacoma, Washington pending removal from the United States. 
30. During consultation with attorneys following the re-entry case, Mr. Medina 
discovered that the conviction in the delivery case is considered an aggravated felony that renders 
him ineligible for any type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. In March 
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2011, Mr. Medina discovered that if he had entered a guilty plea before April 1, 1997, he could 
have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of the law. See lN.S. v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief from deportation available before 
amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April 1997 remains available for 
aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those 
convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of their plea under the law then in 
effect). 
31. Additional affidavits, records and other evidence are being prepared in support of 
the instant Petition and will be filed as soon as they become available. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Received Ineffective J\.!i!sistance of Counsel 
32. Mr. Medina re-alleges Paragraphs l to 30 as if fully set forth herein. 
33. By informing Mr. Medina that his Alford plea would not impact his green card, 
Mr. Posey provided affirmatively incorrect advice, which Mr. Medina relied on in deciding to 
enter the plea. 
34. Upon Mr. Medina, s inquiry as to whether there would be an immigration 
consequence to his plea, Mr. Posey had an obligation to either research the potential inunigration 
consequences or advise Mr. Medina that he did not know the potential impact and recommend 
that he seek the advice of an immigration attorney. By instead providing materially incorrect 
advice, Mr. Posey~s assistance fell below an objective level of competence. 
35. The law indicating that Mr. Medina would be subject to automatic removal from 
the United States based on the conviction in the delivery case was straightforward and succinct. 
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36. Had Mr. Medina known that he would be deported and ineligible to return to the 
United States, he would not have entered an Alford plea and would have insisted on going to 
trial. 
3 7. Had Mr. Medina or Mr. Posey been aware of the status of immigration law at the 
time of the delivery case, Mr. Medina could have negotiated a plea that did not carry such 
profound immigration consequences and/or entered a plea prior to the effective date of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA ), thereby preserving Mr. Medina' g eligibility for 
discretionary relief from deportation. 
3K By informing Mr. Medina that his plea in the delivery case would not effect his 
status as a legal permanent resident, Mr. Posey performed deficiently within the meaning of 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
39. Mr. Medina was prejudiced by Mr. Posey's deficient performance. 
40. Mr. Medina was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
A. That the conviction be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted this 23 day of /f):i1 C ~ '2011. 
~cKAY &BARTLETTLLP 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
8 •VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTIOK RELIEF 
/0 
Mar 23 2011 2:26PM Nevin, Benjamin, ay, B 2083458274 pa 10 
VERIFICATION OF APPLICANT THROUGH COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SS. 
COUNTY OF ADA 
I, Robyn Fyffe, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That I am appearing as counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned 
case. 
3 .. That I am able to converse in the Spanish language. 
4. That I drafted the foregoing Petition based on information that Mr. Medina provided to 
me in telephone calls during his incarceration at the FCI Sheridan and Northwest Detention 
Facility and based on my review of documents in the delivery case, the re-entry case and 
immigration case. 
5. I have reviewed the contents of this Petition with Mr. Medina by telephone and he 
affirmed that the contents therein within his personal knowledge are true i;illd correct. 
6. I have mailed the foregoing Petition in order to obtain Mr. Medina~s notarized 
signature. However, I anticipate it will be several days to weeks before the signed petition 
arrives via U.S. mail. 
7. Mr. Medina is subject to removal from this country until the instant request for post~ 
conviction relief is granted and I am filing the Petition prior to receipt of the signed copy to 
prevent further delay in the proceedings. ~
Robyn Fyffe 
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VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
SS. 
COUNTY OF~~~~-
I, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, being duly sworn upon my oath. depose and say that I have 
subscribed to the foregoing petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and 
allegations therein set forth are true. 
Ernesto G. Medina 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of , 2011. ------
Notary Public for Wasbington 
My commission expires: __ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIF_J.That on this23day of (JJ~ c/k. 
and correct copy of the going document to be: 
faxed 
hand delivered 
to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
Robyn Fyffe 
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l/27/97 PROGRESS NOTE MARIA MEDINA 1 HOUR INDIVIDUAL. 
I have spoke with Vicky regarding Maria Medina1s progress. She has been doing much 
better. She reports that her appetite continues to be good. She says she is sleeping well, 
concentration is good and her sexual relations with her husband are without problems. She denies 
having any symptoms of depression for some time. However, she is experiencing some 
anxiousness at the thought of her husband possibly going to jail again, and fearing she may get 
sick as she was in the past. She also admits to crying on occasion when she thinks about this 
situation. 
It appears Maria suffers a schizo affective disorder. depressive type. Her decompensation 
was precipitated by the arrest of her husband and fear that· something bad was going to happen to 
her and the children. Her psychosis is in remission. However, now that she is beginning to think 
about her husband possibly returning to jail, she is experiencing feelings of anxiousness. She 
reports not having any previous episodes of psychotic symptoms. However, she does recall an 
incident in 1985 at the age of25. At that time she experienced convulsions as a result of a high 
fever. She tends to have strong reactions to high stress situations. She recalls very little of the 
incident that landed her in the hospital. 
Maria bas been taking her medications regularly,. and reports being compliant with her 
treatment regime. She is asking how long does she have to take the medicine. An Appointment 
has been set to see Dr. Hoopes...3/3/97 at .11 :00. She will contact Blanca from OHR to assist her. 
/I /}// r7 
Al Sanchez, MSW ~~-
2/3/97 PROGRESS NOTE INDkUAL 1 HOUR MENTALHEALTH 
Met with Maria. Reviewed mental status. Overall continues to be stable, but is still 
worried about the situation with her husband's legal problems. Mr. Ernesto Medina (husband) 
accompanied Maria. He shared his perceptions that Maria is doing well, and has been for some 
time. Al.so, confirmed that as she begins to think about the possible jail situation) she 8eems more 
anxi01JS and depressed. ~~vezxt ek 
Al Sanchez, M.S.W. tiJ;t',tu, 
2/3/97 PROGRESS NOTE IND UAL 1 HOUR MENTAL HEALTH 
Met with Maria. Reviewed mental status. Overall continues to be stable, but is still 
worried about the situation with her husband's legal problems. Mr. Ernesto Medina (husband) 
accompanied Maria. He shared his perceptions that Maria is doing well, and has been for some 
time. Also,. confirmed that as she begins to think about the possible jail situation, she seems m-0re 
anxious and depressed. f dJ7 next _;veek:. 
Al Sanchez, M.S.W. ~,:Uv~ . 
2/17/97 PROGRESS NOTE I HOUR INDIVIDUAL MENTAL HEALTH 
Maria describes a situation with her husband this past week, where he came home late 
from visiting a friend. She became anxious and upset, and worried that something happened. She 
describes feelings o~tigh s and1re ure in her chest. 
d,d/~ (/ 
/ "°J_/ ,,,-y-/) 
311 ··"7,1;;·7 A1ci.:0ci'~ (_~~ · 
:: / l 7/" ~ /k- 5:ef,-/ ~/ ,JO 
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U.S. Deparlmenl of Justice 
Iminigralion and Naturalization Senice Notice to .Appear 
Jn removal :proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
File No: A.90 623 722 
In the Matter 01: 
'Respondent: ~ Ernesto MEDINA-Gutienez 
c/O USIN&S Custody; 4620 Overland Rm 11108; Boise, ID 83705 
D I . You axe an arrivill.g alien. 
0 2. You are an alien present in the Onited States who has not been admitted or paroled. 
m 3. You h.ave been admitted to the United Slates. but are deporlable for the reasons staled below. 
Tb.e Servfoe alleges lhat you: 
currently relJidinf at: 
(208) 334-1824 
Cp . Are !l.ot ~ eitizell or national of the United stales: ·~ 
Pf 2. Are a native Gf Mexico and a citizen of __ .,,..M_e,x.,..i...,c ... o.__ ____ _ 
1{3. WeTe admitted to ~he United States at Porland, OR on or about December 1, 1990 as a 
S26,' Special Agricultural Worker; pr;. Were, on June 10, 1997, convicted in the District Court of the Third Judicia1,District 
of the State cf Idaho, in and for the County of Payette, for th.e offense of DELIVERY 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732 (Felony). 
. On~;s:\~4 foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United Slates pursuant to the following . . 
~olimon(a}ot;:/: 
" jiction 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), as amended, in tha~ 
any time aiter admission, you have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 
ection l01(a)(43) of the Act. 
CJ 'J'his notice is being issued alter an asylum officer has found th.at \be respondent has demonstrated a credible iear of 
persecution. 
a Section Z!Ul(li}(t} order -.as vacated pursuant to: C 8 CFR 208.30(!}(2) C 6 CTR 235.3(b)(5}(iv) 




oharge(s) ael forlh above. 
{Co:m111tl• Mdn• qf ~ Cwrl.lDdudm.( Boom Jlwm. f1 JDJ) 
lo shoY why you should no mo'Ved from ~he United Slates based on 
Mar 23 2011 2:29PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay, B 2083458274 
Notice to Respondent 
Taming: Any statement you make may be wred against 'you in removal proceedings. 
Alien Registration: Tim copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are under 
removal proceedhlg$. You are required to carry it with you a1 all limes. . 
Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding,_ at no e:xp_~n.se to tlle'Go:;~enl. by an a.ltome! 
or other lndi:vidual authorized and qualified to r~resent persons oefore the"1.:lecutive Office for ImmiW:aliG'Ilf,Review, purauanl lo a CFR 3.16.. Unless you so request. no hearing will. be scheituled earlier than ten days from the date of thls ndtfoe. to allow you 
sufficient time la secure counsel. A liHt of qualified aUorneys and organizations wlio may be available to represent you at no 
eost will be provided wiih this Notice. 
Conduct of the hearing: At the lime of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents which you 
desire to b.ave considered iD. connectioq with your case Ii any document is in a foreign language. JQU rnurl bring the onginal 
and a certified English tra:nslalion Qf the dQcument. Il you wish to have the leslimony of any witnesses considered. y1Ju Should 
arTange to have su:c.h witnes:Jes present at the ,hearing. 
Al your bea.rlng Y.OU will be ~en the op_portunity to admit or deny any or all of lhe aJI_e.,gationB in the Notice lo Appear and that 
yoµ are inadmasible or de:g9rtable on. the eharg.es contained in tlie Notfae to Appear. Ynu :'ill have an op:gortuDity to prinent 
eV!dence on your own behlill. lo examme any imde:nce presented bJ the Government. to ob1ect. ou proper legal gr:ounds. to the 
receipt of evidence and t'Q oross examine any 'Witnesses presented by lhe Government. .Al the conclusion of your :hearing, you 
have a right to appeal an adverse decision. by the immigration judge. 
V(?U, will.be adyised by~~ immjgration.iudge before.whom you appe~, of any relief lroJJ,J remo~al for which you may app~ar. 
eligible. mcludme lh~ pnvilege o! depatfmg voluntarily. You will lie given a reasonable opporluruty to make any sueli applioabon 
lo the unmigrallon }Udge. . 
failure lq aP,pear: Yo'}J ar~ required lo pro:Jide the IN~. iD. 'Writing with your full mailing address and telephone number. You 
mu~ notify tne ImmIU~hon Cour~ imJRed1at~JY.. by us~g ~orw. Eol:R-33 '1!4~~e~er you .. c~!UJ.ge iqur a~dres.~, qr tele~h9:rie nuJnber 
dunng the course cf ibis proceedmg. You "llill be ~rov1ded wn11 a copy or IDlS iorm. Nonces oi D.ea:rmg Wlll oe IOW!ea io lJllS 
address. If you do not submit form EOffi-33 and ao not otherwise pro~de an addres:s at 'Which you may be reached during 
:proceedirl.gs. then the Government shall not be required lo provide you with written. notice of your hearmg. If you fail to attend 
the !:tearin1t at tile tjme and 1'1aoe d~~ated on tfils notice, or any date and time lat.er directed by the migration Court, a 
removal oroer may be made 'by the unmigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detainee! by the lNS. 
Request for PTompl Heanng 
,To expedite a determ.it:lation in ml case. I request an immediate hearing. I waive my right to have a JO'.... day period prior lo 
. appearing before an immigration Judge. 
kdr~4 
' (bb1re of lhsponitnL) 
Certificate of Service 
'J'his Notice lo Appear was served on the nS)londent by me on '1 \'&S ~91 
(Dale) 
compliance with section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Act: 
0 by oerti1ied mail. return re~eipt requested 
~dis a llirt of organizations and attorneys which provide iree legal services. 
in the followin~ manner and in 
t:l by regular mail 
. ~' .• 
~alien 11~ provided oral notice in the ~\)\ \[) language Qf th~ time and place of his or her 
bearing and of the eon.sequen.oes of failure to appear as provided in section 24.0(b)(7) of the 'Aqi . 
. AF~ ?JZ1-'~- ,_,_ . ~-·~--_,.,,~~---'--·,---·--,·---.- ~.o:::,....., ---t71 ~ '"",-t . z 11 - -- -- - - .  ~ s-Y:'::.:???ir'r&": v .:.h\ - -·-
.~tint.ti Blll!R~llll IUraalb &mt.e _,_% ____ ~--lUJL~t~w. 
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U.S. Department of Justicc 
Immigration and Matutalizatlo11 Servlce Warrant of RemovaJ/Deportation 
File No: 90 623 722 
Date: November 19, 1997 
To any officer of the United states Immigration and Naturalization Service: 
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto 
(Full name ()f alien) 
who entered the United States at Portland, OR on 
~~~~-...~~la-ce-o~f~en~tey_,,...j~~ ...... --~ 
is subject to removal/deportation from the United States, based upon a final order by: 
¥ an immigration judge .in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings 
O a district director or a d:isttist director'$ designated official 
O the Board oflnnnigration Appeals 
D a United Stat~ District or Magistrate Court Judge 
and pursuant to the following provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Section 237 (aX2)(AXiii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
December 1, 1990 
(bate Of entry) 
(Signature of INS official) 
District Director 
(Title of INS official) 
November 19, 1997 Eloy, Arizona 
(Dafo and Omce location) 
1-20$ {Rev 4-l-9?)N 
'•-'--<~·· _ . ._._,...,_ ____________ .._ ~ '' I f 
--'--~---- --- ----- .,.,.. ---<. ·-
I 
I 
Mar 23 ?011 2:30PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay, B 2083458274 
' . 
U •• S. Depariment ofJuslico 
Immigration and NnturaUution Service 
To be completed by Service officer executing the warrant: 
Name of alien being removed: 
Warrant of RemovalJDeportation 
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto 
Port, date, and manner of removal: 
Photograph of alien 
removed 
tie ofJNS official) 
'.~:i~1ftf.~i:~:f' 
.... ,~,-.. -~·""';;~:.-. _ __.. 
x fingerprint 
of alien removed 
If actual departure is not witnessed, fully identify source or means of verification of departure 
ursuant to 8 CFR 241. 7, check here. 0 
(J~A.1'- £----?~ 
Departure verified byH· 'tt-:~~~~-<._,;""'-:-o=-:· =:V.;:.Z"!::-~:::----------------
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@,nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
page ,t. 
.--·-·----·-""" -··-·----1 
r FIL· ED • • j mRD JUO!CIAL D!STR!Ci 000R? 
l Payette Ccunt~. tda.r.i.1 I MAR 2 3 2011 
I 
--~-t: 1'>..M ___ .. J.llt 
D y J. DRESSEN 
I -~-ir-
i B 
I ~- .. -- ---·~.,---·-----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE 
COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Ernesto Gutierrez Medina asks this Court, pursuant to IRE 20l(d)~ to take judicial notice of the 
following adjudicative facts: 
1. The files and records in the case of State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County District Court 
Number CR-1995-444. 
2. The files and records in the case of State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County District Court 
Number CR~1996-555. 
1 .. PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
ORIGINAL 
...... ~ -- --· .................. ., ... , ..... ._.,) .... ''"''I I ,._,, ... JI i...,.r c... ..... ._._-r..., ..... i:...t-r 
Dated this ;!')y day of {Y)a/1 c {/J '2011. 
NE~VIN, BENJAMIN, M:KAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
By~-++-+---~~~~~~~~~~ 
Ro~ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thls·:Z~ay of ,IY/at [ t1 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
2011, I caused a true and 
2 •PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
(208) 642-6099 facsimile 
RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT cmm:r 
Payette Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) 
)Ol l- 2 ,J7 ) CASE NO.: CV 
Petitioner, ) 
I oJ ! t.,./ 
) ANSWER TO PETITION FOR POST-
vs. ) CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through, Anne-Marie Kelso, Attorney for the 
State of Idaho, and answers the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition" herein) filed with 
the Court as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST -CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the state unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF l 
II. 
SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
1. Answering paragraphs 2 through 6 of Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein (admit the facts such 
as Petitioner was convicted of the crime, he appealed, etc.) 
2. Answering paragraph 13 and 14, it appears a case was filed in June 27, 1995 and 
dismissed on September 28, 1995. However, according to the Idaho Repository, 
the case which was filed March 5, 1996 (the subject of the instant action) shows a 
violation date of March 5, 1996 and the case filed on June 27, 1995 (the dismissed 
charge) shows a violation date of June 27, 1995. 
3. Answering paragraph 7 (that Petitioner has not filed any prior petitions for post-
conviction relief or petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state or federal court, 
Respondent believes this allegation to be true, but specifically reserves the right to 
raise a successive petitionJres judicata/procedural default bar or defense should 
facts come to light indicating that the allegation is in any party false. 
4. Answering paragraphs 32-40, assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
State denies the allegation. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901 (a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 2 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, 
the claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b ). 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner has failed to file his/ petition within the one year statute of 
limitation and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code § 19-4902( a). The 
Petitioner filed a Motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 on August 11, 1997. The 
Court entered its order on August 15, 1997. The Defendant then had forty two days to 
appeal the conviction, said appeal expiring on September 26, 1997. The Petitioner 
then had one year to file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, which would make the 
statute of limitations expire on September 25, 1998. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner has failed to verify his petition as required by Idaho Code §§ 19-
4902(a) and 19-4903. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, therefore fails to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-
4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
1. That Petitioner's claims for post conviction relief be denied; 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 3 
2. That Petitioner's claims for post conviction relief be summarily dismissed; 
and 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
Dated this 5th day of April, 2011. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 4 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of April, 2011, I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to the 
person(s) indicated: 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Hand Delivery D 
ANSWER TO PETJT!ON FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 5 
U.S. Mail ~ 
31 
I FILED R~ 
l THlRD JUD!C!AL D!S.'TP .• !CT COURT 
J Paveth~ C~n11"<f11 t . .-tnt-.. ..... 
~ .: - --·"''Y• IUC<.:lU f 
VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER I AP I< 1 'l 201'1 
ST A TE OF WASHINGTON I -------:--_-- · - ------P.M. 
c01mTY o/s ·· L~~~ J ~R::~E:~ 
I, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have--
subscribed to the foregoing petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and 
allegations therein set forth are true. 
Ernesto G. Medina 
SUB:~D AND SWORN TO before me this 
tft// ;ik---
·1rday of ,,,jJ 2011. __ _,_ ___ ,
Notary Public for Washington 
My commission expires: ·?- n~,,,~ 
10 •VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
ANNE-MARIE KELSO. 
Payette County Prosechting An;om:1e,y 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
(208) 642-6099 facsimile 
'1 r\ ?ti1·' . .:;; ~ ,!J 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) 
) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319 
Petitioner, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
vs. ) IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
State of Idaho ) 
SS 
County of Payette ) 
Anne Marie Kelso, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Prosecuting Attorney for Payette County, Idaho. 
2. Attached hereto, and incorporated 
Dated this 2 nd 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARIE KELSO 1 
33 
r r!/; 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ~d day of 
~IL 
()"._ -~'1", Sa, to 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: f<\lt \ h{ U r [Du(' l)'YL,, 
My Commission Expires: 'JIL~/ W\'\' 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARJE KELSO 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to 
the person( s) indicated: 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
3 03 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
345-8274 
Hand Delivery D U.S. Mail ~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARIE KELSO 3 
t'age 1 or 4 
Case 
Payette 
3 Cases Found. 
Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Post Susan E 
Case:CV-2011-0000319 District Filed 03/23/2011 Subtype: Conviction Judge: Wiebe Status Pending 
Relief 
Subjects: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez 




03/23/2011 New Case Filed - Post Conviction Releif 
Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings Paid by: Nevin, 
03/23/2011 Benjamin Receipt number: 0003047 Dated: 3/23/2011 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez (subject) 
0312312011 
Other party: State Of Idaho Post Conviction Relief Appearance 
Anne Mane Kelso 
03/23/2011 Subject: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez Appearance Robyn Fyffe 
03/23/2011 Petitioner's Request that the Court take Judicial Notice 
04/05/2011 Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
04/14/2011 Verification of Petitioner 
State of Idaho vs. Ernesto Gutierrez Medina 
No hearings scheduled 
i'Case: CR-1996-0000555 District Judge: ~~=~~ E Amdo~ent$8, 166.14 Closed pending clerk action 
Violation 
' Charges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
Register 
03/05/1996 137-2732(A)(1 )(A)-DEL 
Controlled Substance-
delivery 
Arresting Officer: Payette 





Jail: 12 months 
Suspended Jail: 6 
months 
Det Penitentiary: 6 
months, 2 years 
lndet Penitentiary: 6 
months, 2 years 
Probation: 5 years 
of Date 
actions: 
03/05/1996 New Case Filed 
03/05/1996 Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
03/05/1996 Warrant Issued - Arrest 
07/29/1996 Duplicate Warrant Issued 7/29/96 To Replace 
07/29/1996 Original Which Was Lost. 
07/29/1996 Duplicate Quashed/original Found 
08/09/1996 Warrant Returned 
08/09/1996 Constitutional Rights Warning 
08/09/1996 Arraignment I First Appearance 
08/09/1996 Commitment - Held To Answer 
08/09/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (08/22/1996) William B. Dillon Iii 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=PA YETTE&county=Payette&party... 9/22/2011 
08/09/1996 08/22/1996 
08/22/1996 Continued - Preliminary 
08/22/1996 Affidavit Of Indigence 
08/22/1996 Order Appointing Public Defender 




.. earing Scheduled - Cont Prelim. (08/30/1996) William B. Dillon 
II 
08/22/1996 08/30/1996 
08/23/1996 Subpoena Returned (almarez) 
08/26/1996 Request For Discovery 
08/26/1996 Request For Discovery 
08/29/1996 Subpoena Returned(shuler/walthall/ci95c544) 
08/30/1996 Order Appointing Public Defender 
08/30/1996 Continued - Cont Prelim. 
08/30/1996 Court Minutes 
09/03/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Cont. Prel. Hrg (09/09/1996) Judge Cherin 
09/03/1996 Cont. Prelim. Hrg 
09/03/1996 Change Assigned Judge 
09/06/1996 Affidavit Of Atty. Fees & Costs 
09/06/1996 Magistrate's Approval - For Atty. Fees 
09/06/1996 Substitution Of Counsel 
09/06/1996 Notice Of Appearance 
09/06/1996 Waiver Of Time Limit On Setting Preliminary 
09/10/1996 Change Assigned Judge 
09/10/1996 Continued - Cont. Prel. Hrg 
09/10/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Cont. Prelimi. (09/20/1996) James C. Peart 
09/10/1996 Prelim. On 9/20/96 
09/11/1996 Order For Payment Of Attys Fees & Costs 
09/20/1996 Hearing Waived - Cont. Prelimi. 
09/20/1996 Order Binding To District Court 
09/20/1996 Order Of Commitment - Bond Reduced 
09/23/1996 Criminal Information 
09/24/1996 Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over) 
09/24/1996 Transfer In (from Idaho Court Or County) 
09/24/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Arraignment (10/04/1996) Gerald L. Weston 
10/04/1996 Arraignment I First Appearance 
10/04/1996 Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
10/04/1996 Miscellaneous 
10/17/1996 Order Setting Case For Trial, Copy Attys. 
10/17/1996 Frates & Posey 
1011711996 
Jury Trial Scheduled - Feb.4 & 5, 1997 (02/04/1997) Dennis E. 
Goff 
11/13/1996 Bond Posted - Surety 
11/13/1996 Stipulation And Order Copies: Frates, 
11 /13/1996 Posey & Sheriff 
11/13/1996 Waiver Of Extradition 
11/13/1996 Order To Release Copies: Birch, Posey And 
11/13/1996 Sheriff 
01/30/1997 Stipulation And Order To Continue Copies: 
01/30/1997 Frates And Posey, Attys 
01 /30/1997 Continued 
01/30/1997 Jury Trial Scheduled - (04/15/1997) Dennis E. Goff 
!:'age,:, or"!-
https://www.idcourts.us/repository I case History .do ?ro~ezl=yes&schema= PA YETTE&county=Payette&party .. . 912212011 
iuauv l'-C]JV"HVIJ - va::.c n1Mu1y ra)'!'" 
02/03/1997 Defendant's Waiver Of Statutory Right To 
02/03/1997 Speedy Trial 
02/05/1997 Unavailable Dates 
04/11 /1997 Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
04/15/1997 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t 
0411511997 
Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (06/06/1997) Stephen W. 
Drescher 
04/15/1997 Court Minutes 
05/16/1997 Affidavit Of Restitution 
06/06/1997 Notice To Defendant Upon Sentencing Copies 
06/06/1997 Frates And Posey 
06/06/1997 Hearing Held - Sentencing 
06/06/1997 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
06/06/1997 Sentenced To Incarceration 
06/06/1997 Probation Ordered 
06/06/1997 Case Status Closed But Pending 
06/06/1997 Court Minutes 
06/09/1997 Bond Exonerated 
06/10/1997 Judgment And Commitment & Order Of Probation 
06/10/1997 On Suspended Execution Of Judgment Copies: 
06/10/1997 Frates, David L. Posey, Prob, Jail 
06/16/1997 Amended Judgment & Commitment & Order Of Prob 
06/16/1997 On Suspended Execution Of Judgment Copies: 
06/16/1997 Frates, Posey, Prob, Jail 
07 /11 /1997 Amended Supplemental Judgment & Commitment 
07/11/1997 And Order Of Probation On Suspended Ex-
07/11/1997 Cution Of Judgment Copies: Frates, Posey 
07/11/1997 & Prob 
08/01/1997 Stipulation And Order To Unseal Pre-sentence 
08/01/1997 Report 
08/01/1997 Order To Unseal Pre-sentence Report 
08/11 /1997 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
08/11 /1997 Hearing Scheduled - (08/15/1997) Stephen W. Drescher 
08/14/1997 Reopen (case Previously Closed) 
08/15/1997 Disposition With Hearing 
08/15/1997 Order On Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
08/15/1997 Frates, Posey, Sheriff, Immigration 
08/15/1997 Case Status Closed But Pending 
08/15/1997 Court Minutes 
09/26/1997 Order Allowing Unsupervised Probation, Copies 
09/26/1997 Frates, Posey, Prob 
09/30/2009 Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record 
09/15/2010 By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: public Receipt number: 
0008579 Dated: 9/15/2010 Amount: $86.00 (Cash) 
State of Idaho vs. Ernesto Gutierrez Medina 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1995-0000444 . William B Amount Magistrate Judge: Dillon 111 due: $0.00 Closed 
Ch 
Violation 
arges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
38 
t'age J or 4 
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Register 
06/27/1995 137-2732(A)(1 )(A)-DEL 
Controlled Substance-
delivery 
Arresting Officer: Payette 








06/27 /1995 New Case Filed 
06/27/1995 Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
06/27/1995 Warrant Issued - Arrest 
08/28/1995 Ct Mtns From Malheur County 
09/01/1995 Warrant Returned 
09/01 /1995 Arraignment I First Appearance 
09/01/1995 Constitutional Rights Warning 
09/01/1995 Order To Release 'or' 
09/01/1995 Waiver Of Extradition 
09/05/1995 Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (09/15/1995) William B. Dillon Iii 
09/05/1995 Prelim 9/15/95 
09/08/1995 Order & Motion To Continue 
09/08/1995 Continued - Preliminary 
09/11/1995 Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (09/28/1995) William B. Dillon Iii 
09/11 /1995 Cont Prelim 9/28/95 
09/14/1995 Sam Almarez 
09/20/1995 Waiver Of Time 
09/27/1995 Notice Of Compliance 
09/28/1995 Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing - Cont Prelim 
09/28/1995 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
10/03/1995 Subpoena Returned 
0512512005 STATUS CHANGED (batch process) 
Connection: Public 
3~ 
rage 't 01 't 
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ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
(208) 642-6099 facsimile 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COllRT 
Payette County, Idaho 
. __ B_E~SSEN __ 
BY------'-------· Deput 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) 
) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
vs. ) AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) THEREOF 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney 
for Payette County, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906, and moves for summary disposition 
of Petitioner's petition for post conviction relief on the general basis that, in light of the pleadings, 
answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition is untimely and is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 5, 1996, the Petitioner was charged with Delivery of a Controlled 
Substance. On June 6, 1997, the Petitioner, having entered a plea to the charge, was 
sentenced to the Delivery charge and placed on probation. An amended judgment was 
filed on June 16, 1997 and yet another amended supplemental judgment was filed on 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 1 
July 11, 1997. The Defendant then filed a Motion pursuant to ICR, Rule 35 and the 
order on said motion was entered August 15, 1997. The last activity on the case was 
September 26, 1997, when the Court released the Defendant from supervised 
probation. 
II. 
GUTIERREZ MEDINA'S PETITION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED 
Idaho Code Section 19-4902, setting forth a one year statute of limitations for 
post conviction proceedings, provides in pertinent part, "[a]n application may be filed 
at any time within one year from the expiration of time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceedings following an 
appeal, whichever is later." The construction of such statute is a question of law over 
which the court exercises free review. Freeman v. State 122 Idaho 627, 628, 839 P.2d 
1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992); Hanks v. State 121Idaho153, 154, 823 P.2d 187, 188 
(Ct. App. 1992). In Evensiosky v. State 136 Idaho 189, 191 (2001), the Supreme Court 
reinforced the one year statute oflimitations. The Court held that I .C. § 19-4902 
expressly limits a party's time to bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year. 
Furthermore, the time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief begins upon either 
the determination of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for the filing of an 
appeal. I.C. § 19-4902. Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires appeals be filed within 
forty-two (42) days of the filing of any appealable judgment, order, or decree of the 
district court. In the case at bar, since there was no direct appeal, the time for filing an 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 2 
41 
appeal expired forty two days after the order on the Motion for Rule 35 Relief, or 
September 26, 1997. 
Petitioner's petition was filed more than one year and forty two days from 
determination of his Rule 35 Motion. Petition did not appeal any decisions of the 
court. Accordingly, Petitioner's post conviction relief in barred by the statute of 
limitations and should be dismissed for said ~n. 
Dated this 22°' day of September, 01 ·1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to 
the person(s) indicated: 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
345-8274 
Hand Delivery D U.S. Mail L8J 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 4 
ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
(208) 642-6099 facsimile 
IRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) 
) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319 
Petitioner, ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING FOR MOTION 
vs. ) FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney 
for Payette County, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906, and gives notice that the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition will be heard at the Payette County Courthouse, 
1130 Third Avenue North, Payette, Idaho on the 4th day of November, 2011at2:00 p.m. or as 
soon thereafter as may be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING I 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to 
the person(s) indicated: 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
345-8274 





NOTICE OF HEARING 2 
ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North 
Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
208-642-6096 
Fax:208-642-6099 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER TO CONTINUE 
V. ) 
) 




Based on the foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal scheduled for the 4th day of November, 2011, is continued to the 18th of November, 
2011 at 2:00 p.m. 
--T" 
DATED this Q<a day of September, 2011, 
j 
d ___ ~,w 
District Judge 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the f~ day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method (s) indicated 
below, to the person (s) listed below: 
Robin Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY and BARTLETT, 303 West Bannock, P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Hand Delivery __ U.S. Mail_L 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North 
Payette, ID 83661 
Hand Delivery __ _ U.S. Mail 




BETTY J. DRESSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY ~ 
DEPUT1=ER:K 
Nov 10 2011 z:51PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mrkay, B 2083458274 
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
page '.:'. 
FILED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Payette ~~nty, Idaho 
NOV l O 2011:! 
---A.~J:'.:._..._,__P.ft4. 
Y J. DRESSEN 
B , De ut 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 









Petitioner, CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
vs. AFFIDA VJT OF COUNSEL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Robyn Fyffe~ being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I am counsel for the Petitioner, Ernesto G. Medina, in the above-entitled case. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, filed 
on April 1 1, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case Number CR-FE~ I 996-555. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Court Minutes from the 
sentencing hearing that occurred on June 6, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case 
Number CR-FE-1996-555. 
1 • AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Nov 10 2011 2:57PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mrl-::iy, B 2083458274 page ~ 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Amended Supplemental 
Judgment of Conviction, filed on July 11, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case 
Number CR-FE-1996-555. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Criminal Docket in USA v. 
]vfedina-Gutierrez, 3:10-cr-00389-J\1.A. Counsel obtained this copy with her PACER account from the 
CM/ECF website for the United States District Court, District of Oregon. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Judgment filed on December 10, 
2010 in USA v. Medina-Gutierrez, 3: 1 O-cr-00389-MA. The undersigned obtained this copy with her 
PACER account from the CMJECF website for the United States District Court, District of Oregon. 
8. On March 8, 2011, the undersigned obtained a copy of the Prosecution Report from the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement from Mr. Medina's attorney in the re·entry case. A true and 
correct copy of that report is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
This ends my affidavit. 
2 • AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
page A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this_ day of November 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 ~ 
Robyn Fyffe 
3 • AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
5D 
Nov 10 2011 2:57PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr'' "Y, 8 2083458274 
JI I'"':' : ··~\ ,':,) 
.. ~. · ·. ·,. ·ORIGINAt 
David . Lee Posey 
'· · At to};:.~ex . at Law 
P . o ~ ··'} Box s 
i;>ayettet7i ID 83661 - 0005 
,208/6,42,;;~339 
' '." . ·~ .... : ; ·. ··' 
Attorney for Defendant 




. . . . \iJiJlCV.L tJISIRK:T COURT 
. . ,, .. it• Covrt1'f, !doho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
.. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
j~ ( 










Case N~. CR-FE-96-00555 
Plaintiff 
vs. RULE ll PLEA AGREEMENT 
I 
Lee Posey, attorney for Defendant and Gregory F. 
. \~~Frat~~;~,·:. att·o~ney for Plaintiff, enter into a Plea Agreem~nt 
;~ ~J.;: :~~~~1.· : ..;.<~?-< :·;_·: ... ;:~ ~.. . .. 
: ~ , _,,,,,.)':F the ":Provisions of Rule J.J.(d} (l.} (C) I.C.R. ·on 
f ·+ ;~~k~g,;i '..~~~;f!r Defendant will withdr'!-w' his plea of, n.ot . 9rtlty 
; . : /;:.~riteq:<)1n·:'Alford plea · of. guilty to the charge, of Delivery of 
",~~iw[:~:~- ·.:~¢onif~1iid substance in violation of section 37-2732, Ida~o 
in the Criminal Information. 
the Defendant be placed on probation for a period 
under the standard conditions of 
special condition: That t~~ Defendant serve 
~ '. ' 
jail with credit for 97 
, ~ule .. ll Plea Agreement - 1 51 
Nov 10 2011 2:58PM Nevin, Benjamin, M,..' .. v, B 2083458274 page " 
,. .. • I . .. 
.. .. that. 'the ." probation officer believes can be c orrected by the 
: _~{·:~ ~~~f~:;:4:r~ ~E~\;~t:~-i·:: ·~~:~~·:~~/!I~:r}~~itf.: _ · 
. ·.'.·;;· : '·: : ·< ·,~ a~rv~ce/~6~ all o r a portion of the discretionary jail- term. The 
~:f,~i;~i\ .:~:-~~ · '· Ffg:~:;-l{~J;;~c~ ;?;~~ii': .. ·. . . f • .· 
"~~'.:·? : ' <; : Defe~~ant to serve the remaining 83 days in the Payette County }jg;~~~~ .. ));: 
.{,~-~l ~it,h workout privileges. 
;~· . 
3. .That no additional charges will be filed against the 
. · ·~~~ 1~~~8~·Afr· for any criminal conduct involving controlled 
~~.:;,~iiJuhst'aricies which the Defendant is alleged to have committed 
~ ·~~~~'1-~ ·:' . 'l:: . ·:. ''?~~~·· .. . 
'• '-'··'"'i" :·: to his arrest in this case. 
·;~~~~~*~: ~ ' .: " ..., . ·:,'.( . . .; '
4 . . The Defendant will, if requested, meet with agents for 
the Idaho Criminal Bureau of Investigation and will cooperate 
the involvement of other potential criminal 





Rule 11 Plea Agreement - 2 
Nov 1 O 2011 3:00PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr"-.y, B 208345827 4 page 
7 
-, 
~· i • /: 
" 
J 
IN TaB DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDZCI:AL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF JJ:>UO, :X:N HD FOR '1'HE COUN'l?Y OF PAYETTE 






Ernesto G. Medina, 
Defendant. 
......... 
The Honorable Stephen w. Drescher 
Denece Graham 






Case No. CR-FE-96-00555*0 
Court Minutes 
~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~> 
This beinq the time and place set for sentenoinq, present before 
'·<::t;t;;,,",t,he Honorable Stephen w. Drescher were the defendant in person and 
.. }t~+;~',l'ly··· and through his counse1 of record David L. Posey and the state 
. :;-;~)·of Idaho represented by Gregory F. Frates, Payette• County 
'·\ · Prosecutinq Attorney. Shirley Watson was certified. court 
· interpreter :for the de·fendant • 
. 'The Court reviewed the Rule 11 plea agre~ent which had been filed 
:: in· this matter and ascertained there were no corrections to the PSI 
a~ditional testimony. • · 
.The State concurred with. the recommendations of the PSI. Counsel 
stipulated to Restitution in the amount of $765.00. 
Mr. Posey concurred with the PSI - sentencing shou1d be pursuant to 
.the ;Rule 11 agreement. Mr. Posey col'.lcurred with the restitution 
amount of $765.00 and noted the PSI was not consistent with the 
Rule 11 agreement. 
The Court questioned the defendant as to prior record and how the 
offense took place. 
:;r;if~~tih'J.'he s~ate advised the Court, the arrest record for the defendant 
f:fi1,IF.'.-stemm..ed from this same charge, it had been dismissed and refiled. 
·r-::~: /r· , . ~ 
"" ~ The court admonished the defendant, that he was trafficking in 
· ;. drugs, that his substance evaluation showed he was chemically 
dependent, that the defendant was not being truthfully with the 
court about his involvement just as he was not truthfully about his 
substance dependence. 
·Based ·upon presentations of counsel, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, 
.the non presentation of the defendant and the ends of sentencing, 
the court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the ISBC for a 
determinate period of 2 1/2 years 'to be followed by an 
EXHIBIT __B_ 






indeterminate period of 2 1/2 years for an aggregate total of five 
years. The Court suspended execution of the sentence and placed 
the defendant on probation for a period of five years, under the 
standard terms and conditions which the cqurt delineated for the 
defendant. The standard court costs and fees were imposed, the 
defendant shall made drug restitution to the State of Idaho in the 
amount of $765.00. 
The Court imposed 360 days in the Payette county Jail, suspended 
180 days which it granted as discretionary jail time to the 
defendant's probation officer. The remaining 180 days shall be 
served with work release and credit for 97 days served. The 
defendant shall report to the Payette County Jaii on July a, 1997, 
at 8:00 p.m. to begin serving his jail time. 
The defendant will have to work with his probation officer, as far 
as his living arrangements in Oregon. 
The following Other Special Conditions were imposed: 
OTHER SPEC7AL CQNDXTIONS: 
1. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete'. any and 
a11 programs of rehabilitation as required by his probation 
officer. 
2.. The defendant shall not consume any alcohol while on· probation. 
Post conviction rights were given and PSI's wer~ returned. 
Court was adjourned. 
Stephen W. DreschQr, District Judge 
, Clerk of the Court 
COURT MINUTES 2 
Nov 10 2011 3:01 PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr'"'\/, B 2083458274 page " m:ria 
. . ~ it: 11 
·: f 
STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'.t'Y OF PAYET~E 
* * * • * * * * * 
THE STATE OF :IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 










case No. CR-F~96-po555~D 
AMENDED ~;d-. 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
ON SUSPENDED EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
on this 6th day of June, 1997, personally appeared, Gregory F. 
Frates Prosecutinq Attorney for Payette County, Idaho, and the 
., defendant Ernesto G,. Me4ina and the defendant's attorney David L. 
Posey. 
zg;a :rs ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon an a1fo.rd . 
plea of quilty of the offense of Delivery of a controlled SUbstance 
ac•.violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732 (Felony), committed on or 
about May 4, 1995. 
Tile court having asked whether the defendant had any legal cause to 
show why Judgment should not be pronounced against the defenda~t, 
and no sufficient cause to the contrary havihq been shown or 
·appearinq to the Court, 
I~ IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is quil ty as charged and 
convicted. 
:tT :rs 1'11RTHBR ADJUDGED that the defendant. be sentenced to the 
custody of the Idaho state Board of Correction {or a minimum period 
of confinement of two an4 one/balt years and a subsequent; 
indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed two anti one/half,):. 
years, for a ~otal aggregate term of five years. · · 
·~.AND IT IS ORDER~J> that the execution .of this Judgment be suspend~~­
in compliance with Idaho Code 19-2601, Sub-Section 2·, and that the~:.; 
~efendant be placed on probation under the supervision and control" 
of the Idaho State Depart.J.Uent of Corrections, Probation and Parole 
Division and this Court for a period of five years, commencing on 
the 6th day of June, 1997 , and under the fol lowinq terms and 
conditions: 
r.··· 
That the defendant shall: (a) violate no State, Federal or 
MUnicipal penal laws; (b) not change residence without first :P 
obtaininq written permission from the· supervisinq officer; (cj 
55 
Nov 10 2011 3:02PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr'-..,y, B 2083458274 page ~0 
;./ ) 
submit a truthful written report to the supervising officer each 
and every month and report in person when requested; (d) not leave 
the state or Third Judicial District (Adams, Gem, canyon, Owyhee, 
Payette and Washington counties) without first obtaining written 
permission from the supervising officer; (e) seek and :maintain 
employment or program approved by the supervising officer, and not 
change employment or program without first obtaining written 
permission from the supervising officer; (f) waives constitutional 
right to be free from search and consents to the search of person, 
residence, vehicle or property at request of the supervising 
officer; (g) not purchase or possess any firearms or weapons; (h} 
not consume or possess any controlled substances without a valid 
prescription; (i) submit to a test for controlled substance· or 
alcohol at probationer's ·own expense upon the request of the 
supervising officer; (j) follow advice and instructions of the 
supervising officer~ 
SPECIAL CQN'I)%TlONS 
IT XS PURTHBR ORDBRBD that the defendant pay each of the sums 
indicated, in the manner and on such terms as are more particularly 
specified below: 
l. COUR~ COSTS (IC S31-3201A(l>) > - court costs of $17. 50 for 
eac~ felony will immediately be paid to the clerk of the 
court. 
2. VIC~IM'S COMPBNSATION ACCOUNT cs 72-1025) - A fine of 
($25.00 (or) $50.00) per count will immediately be paid to the 
clerk of the court for deposit into the crime victims' 
compensation account. In addition to the $25.oo misdemeanor 
and $50.00 felony reimbursement, there is a reimbursement of 
not less than $200.00 per count for any conviction or finding 
of guilt for any sex offense, including, but not limited to, 
offenses under Sections 18-1506, 18-1507, 18-1508, 18-lSOSA, 
lS-6101, 18-6101, 18-6108, l8-66D5 and 18-6608. (See Ch. 278, 
1993 session laws.) FOR A TOTAL OF: $50.00. 
3. PRODATIOlf SUPBRVISZON/WORK RBLBASB RBIHBURSEMENT .. _ A sum 
of not more than $35.00 per month for probation supervision if 
such payment is determined by the Division of Probation and 
Parole of the Idaho Department of Corrections to be 
appropriate. The exact amount to be paid, and the terms and 
conditions of payment, will be determined by the Division of 
Probation and Parole. (IC §20-255) 
The County Sheriff will collect the earnings of any prisoner 
on work release and deduct therefrom the cost of said 
prisoner's board and personal expenses. 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER 










4.. CODlmJ:TY SD.VJ:CE FEE - A fee of $ ($. 60 x number of 
hours of community service) will be paid to the clerk of the 
court for defendant's workers compensation coverage {IC §31-
3201C). 
5. VICTIM RESTITU'fJ:ON - None 
6.. P.O.S.'l' .. - A fee of $6.00 for deposit into the peace 
officers standards and training account. 
7. PUBLJ:C DEFENDER COSTS - The sum to be determined by 
affidavit as reimbursement to the County for the expense 
incurred in providing legal representation and other necessary 
services. None 
s. PROSECUTION COS'l'S (probationers/withheld judgments only) 
As a condition of probation-and/or withheld judgment, the sum 
of $ will be paid to the clerk of the court for the 
prosecution of this criminal proceeding, to be distributed 
pursuant to r.c. §19-4705. 
9. CRJ:MINAL PINB - For violation of (statute), a fine of 
$ is hereby imposed, which sum shall be paid to the clerk 
of the court for distribution. None 
10. $5.00 COUlf'l'Y ADMINISTRA~IVB SURCHAR.GB - For deposit in 
the county justice fund or current expense fund. 
11. $15.00 SURCBARGB--DUI AND DWP ONLY - To fund interlock 
ignition and electronic monitoring devices, which shall be 
paid to the clerk of the court. 
12. DRUG Ellli'ORCEMBN~ R2STXTU~%Cll1 - The sum 1isted be1ow shall 
be paid to the agency or agencies listed below as restitution 
for the costs of investigation and/or prosecution of the 
violations hereinabove found to have been committed, to-wit: 
$765.00 to the State of Idaho. 
All of the previous stated amounts of money are.due and payable to 
the District Court Clerk at a rate set by the defendant's probation 
officer commencing on a date set by defendant's probation officer, 
and a like monthly payment on the same day of each and every month 
thereafter until completely paid. 
I~ IS PORTKBR OlU>BRED-the defendant is to serve 36~ days in the 
Payette County Jail, the court suspended 180 days, which it granted 
as discretionary jail time, to be imposed upon written request of 
this court. The remaining 180 days shall be served with credit for 
97 days already served. The defendant shall report to the Payette 
County Sheriff on July 8, 1997, at 8:00 p.m. and will be allowed 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER 
OF PROBATION ON SUSPENDED EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT . 
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work release. 
OTIJBR SPECIAL CONDXTXONS: 
l. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete any and 
all programs of rehabilitation as required by his probation 
officer. 
2.. The defendant shall not consume any alcohol while on probation. 
The terms of defendants probation may be revoked, modified or 
extended at any time by the Court and, in the event of· any 
violation of the conditions hereof, during the period of probation, 
the Court may revoke this Order and cause the sentence to be 
imposed. Defendant is s ject to arrest without warrant for 
violation of ~y conditio reby imposed. 
DATED this µay of , 1997 
.Stephen 
I understand, accept and will abide by the terms and conditions of 
the above Order. 
Dated this 07 day of .... :r:....._~_.__'t.,,.._ _____ , 1997. 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER 
OF PROBATION ON SUSPENDED EX~CUTION 
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TERMINATED 
U.S. District Court 
District of Oregon (Portland) 
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 3:10-cr .. 00389-MA All Defendants 
Case title: USA v. Medina-Gutierrez 





ILLEGAL ENTRY BY ELUDING 
EXAMINATION AND INSPECTION 
BY IMMIGRATION OFFICERS - 8 
USC 1325(a) (misdemeanor) 
(2) 
Highest Offense Level (Opening) 
Petty Offense 
Terminated Counts 
REENTRY OF DEPORTED ALIEN = 
8 USC 1326(a) 
(1) 
Highest Offense Level (Terminated) 
Felony 
Complaints 
Date Filed: 09/30/2010 
Date Terminated: 12/08/2010 
represented by Gerald M. Needham 
5°} 
Office of the Federal Public Defender 
101 S.W. Main Street 
Suite 1700 
Portland, OR 97204 
(503) 326-2123 
Pax: (503) 326-5524 
Email: jerry _needham@fd.org 
AJTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: Public Defender or 
Community Defender Appointment 
Disposition 
IMPRISONMENT= 167 DAYS; FEE 
ASSESSMENT= $10 
Disposition 
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represented by Fredric N. Weinhouse 
United States Attorney's Office 
1000 S. W. Third A venue 
Suite 600 
Portland, OR 97204 
(503) 727-1014 
Fax: (503) 727-1117 
Email: fred. weinhouse@usdoj.gov 
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Docket Text 
Ryan W. Bounds 
U.S. Attorney's Office 
1000 SW 3rd Ave 
Rm600 
Portland, OR 97204 
(503) 727-1141 
Fax: (503) 727-1117 
Email: ryan.bounds@usdoj.gov 
TERMINATED: 1011812010 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Indictment as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (l); Count 1: 8 USC 
1326(a) - Illegal Reentry by Deported Alien; Count 2: 8 USC 1325(a) Illegal 
Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers 
(misdemeanor). (kw) (Entered: 09/30/2010) 
Notice of Case Assignment to Judge Anna J. Brown. (kw) (Entered: 
0913012010) 
Minutes of Proceedings: First Appearance/Arraignment/Detention hearing 
before Magistrate Judge Paul Papak as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez 
held on 10/1/2010. Arraignment held for Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez {l) Count 
1,2. Defendant(s) waived reading of the Indictment. Defendant(s) advised of 
rights; waives reading of charges~ proceeds as named. Not guilty plea(s) 
entered. Order that Discovery is due in 14 days. Order appointing counsel. 
Detention Hearing held Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (1) Defendants Location-
Custody status is: Detained as flight risk. Jury Trial is set for 1217/2010 at 
09:00AM in Portland Courtroom before Judge Anna J. Brown. Counsel Present 
for Plaintiff: Ryan Bounds. Counsel Present for Defendant: Gerald Needham. 
(Tape #FTR (gm)) (Interpreter for Defendant Present: Tina Machuca) (gm) 
(Entered: 10/01/2010) 
Amended Minutes ol Proceedings: First Appearance/ Arraignment/Detention 
hearing before Magistrate Judge Paul Papak as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-
too 
https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pJ ?583700927244419-L_ 452_0-1 2/25/2011 
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Gutierrez held on 10/1/2010. Arraignment held for Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez 
(1) Count 1,2. Defendant(s) waived reading of the Indictment. Defendant(s) 
advised of rights; waives reading of charges; proceeds as named. Not guilty 
plea(s) entered. Order that Discovery is due in 14 days. Order appointing 
counsel. Detention Hearing held Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez ( 1) Defendants 
Location-Custody status is: Detained as flight risk. 1-Day Jury Trial is set for 
1217/2010 at 9:00AM in Portland Courtroom before Judge Anna J. Brown. 
Counsel Present for Plaintiff: Ryan Bounds. Counsel Present for Defendant: 
Gerald Needham. (Tape #FfR (gm)) (Interpreter for Defendant Present: Tina 
Machuca) (gm) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/01/2010 ~ Order of Detention as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez by US 
Magistrate Judge Paul Papak; signed on 10/1/10. (kw) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/06/2010 Q Request for Discovery by Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (Needham, Gerald) 
(Entered: 10/06/2010) 
10/0612010 ~ Arrest Warrant Returned Executed on 10/1/l 0 as to Defendant Ernesto 
Medina-Gutierrez. (kw) (Entered: 10/13/2010) 
10/07/2010 1 Trial Management Order by Judge Anna J. Brown as to Ernesto Medina-
Gutierrez. (bb) (Entered: 10/07/2010) 
10/18/2010 .2 Notice of Attorney Substitution: Attorney Fredric N. Weinhouse added for 
Plaintiff USA regarding Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez in place and 
stead of Attorney Ryan W. Bounds. (Weinhouse, Fredric) (Entered: 
10/18/2010) 
1112212010 10 Notice of Case Reassignment: Case reassigned from Judge Anna J. Brown to 
Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. (eo) (Entered: 11122/2010) 
1112912010 11 Scheduling Order as to Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. A Change of Plea and 
Sentencing Hearing is set for 12/8/2010 at 09:30AM in Judge Marsh's 
Courtroom before Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. The 2-day jury trial, set for 
1217/2010, is stricken. by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh (ca) (Entered: 11129/2010) 
12/08/2010 12 Minutes of Proceedings:Bntry of Plea Hearing before Judge Malcolm F. 
Marsh for Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. Defendant present; defendant 
sworn. Defendant entered a guilty plea to Count 2 of the Indictment. Following 
a RuJe 11 col1oquy, the court found the defendant fully competent, accepted his 
plea and adjudged him guilty of that offense. Defendant waived preparation of 
a presentence report and the court found that one was unnecessary; the court 
sentenced defendant to 167 days on Count 2. Defendant shall pay a $10.00 fee 
assessment and no fine. The Court GRANTED the government's oraJ motion to 
dismiss Count l as to this defendant. Appellate rights waived, and defendant 
was remanded to the U.S. Marshal. See Formal Judgment. Counsel Present for 
Plaintiff: Fredric N. Weinhouse.Counsel Present for Defendant: Gerald M. 
Needham.(Court Reporter Bonita Shumway)(Interpreter for Defendant Present: 
Tina Machuca) (ca) (Entered: 12/08/2010) 
12/08/2010 1J Plea Petition as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez and Order Entering 
Plea signed by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh in open court on 12/8/l 0. (kw) 
(Entered: 12/08/2010) 
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12/08/2010 li Plea Agreement as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. (kw) (Entered: 
12108/2010) 
12/0812010 ll Judgment & Commitment as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (1), 
Count 1 of the Indictment = DISMISSED ON MOTION OF GOVERNMENT; 
Count 2, (8 USC 1325(a) =Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and 
Inspection by Immigration Officers - misdemeanor): IMPRISONMENT= 167 
DAYS; FEE ASSESSMENT= $10; Defendant remanded to custody of US 
Marshal; by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh; signed on 12/8/10. (kw) (Entered: 
12/08/2010} 
12/08/2010 16 Judgment in a Criminal Case Personal Identification Attachment (AO 245H) as 
to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. This document is filed UNDER 
SEAL. (kw) (Entered: 12/08/2010) 
02/02/2011 17 Judgment & Commitment 15 as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez 
returned executed on 115/11; Defendant received at FDC - Sheridan, Sheridan, 
Oregon. (kw) (Entered: 02/03/2011) 
I PACER Service Center I 
I Transaction Receipt I 
I 02/25/201114:11:27 l 
IP ACER llnh0091 f(g:;:: llmedina I 1Lomn: 
!Description: I I Docket ll~earcb 113: 10-cr-00389-MA Start date: 1 I Report Criteria: l/1/1970 End date: 2/25/2011 I 
Billable iLJ!cost: 110.24 I Pages: 
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Case 3:10-cr-00389- Document 15 Filed 12/08/ 10 Page 1 of 4 Page iD#: 54 
A0245B (Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRlCT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 711/08 
Sheet 1 
UNITED STATES DISTlUCT COURT 
DISTRICT OF OREGON 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
v. Case Number: CR 10~389-MA 
ERNESTO MEDINA-GUTIERREZ USM Number: 74001065 
ELLEN C. PITCHER 
Defendant's Attorney 
FREPRJC N. WEINHOUSE 
AssiBtant U.S. Attorney 
THE DEFENDANT: 
pleaded guilty to count 2 of the Indiclment. [X} 
[ J pleaded nolo contendere to cOWll:(s) ____________ which was accepted by tile court 
[ ] was found guilty on count(s) ___________ ___,after a plea of not guilty. 
The defendant is adjudicated guilty ofthe following offense(s): 
Date Olfease Count Npmber{s) 
Title & Seqlog Nature ofOff'ense Coneluded 
8 USC § 132S(a} E1uding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers September 13, 2010 2 
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through i of this judgm.c:nt. The sentence is imposed plll'Suantto the Sentencing Reform 
Act ofl984. 
( ] The defendant has been fuundnot guilty on count(s) and is discharged as to such coWlt(s). 
[X] Count t of the Indictment is dismi$$Erl on the motion of the United States. 
[XJ The de:Rm.dant shall pay a $pecial assessment in the amount of$.lll.JH! for Count i payabre immediately to the Clerk of the U.S. 
District Court. (See also the Criminal Monetary Penalties sheet.) 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attomey for this district within 30 days of any change of name, 
residence. or mailing address until all fines, restitution. costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered 
to pay restitution, the defendant shall notify the oowt and the United States Attorney of any material change in the defendant's ec<momic 
circwnstances. 
Decembers, 2010 
Date of Imposition ofSetitence 
M~~ 
Signature of Judicial Officer 
MALCOLM F. MARSH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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AO 245B (Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 7 /1/08 
Sheet 2 - Imprisonment 
DEFENDANT: MEDINA-GUTIERREZ, ERNBSTO Judgment-Page 2 of 4 
CASE NUMBER: CR 10·389-MA 
IMPRISONMENT 
As to count Two (.2), the defendant is hereby committed to the cust-Ody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be 
imprisoned fur a tenn of one hundred sixty-seven (J 67) days. No fine is being imposed as defendant has no flnancial 
resources or appreciable ellllling capacity. 
(X ) The court makes the following re<:om:mendations to the Blll'eall of Prisons: FCl, Sheridan. Oregon, to facilitate visiting 
opportul'lities with tamily who reside in the area. 
[X] The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal. 
[ ] The defendant shal~ surrender to the United Sm.res Marshal for this district: 
[ ] at Jam. [ I p.m. on. ________ _ 
[ ] as notified by the United States Marsha.I. 
[ J The defendant shall SUtrendm- for service of sentence at tile institution designated by the Bureau <>f Prisons: 
[ ] before 2:00 p.m. on __________ _ 
[ ) ~s notified by the United States Marshal and/or Pretrial Services. 
The Bmeau of Prisons will determine the amount of prior custody that may be credited towards the service of sentence as authoriud by 
Title 18 USC §358.5{b) and the Policies oflhe Bureau of Pmons. 
RETURN 
l havo ex:ei:uted 1bis judgmc;nt as :follows: 
Defendant delivered on _____________ to. ------------
at __________________ _. with a certified copy of this judgment. 
UNITED STA TES MARSHAL 
BY~--~-----~--------~~ 
DEPUTY UNITED STA TES MARSHAL 
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AO 245B (Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case~ DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 7/1108 
Sb.eet 5 - Criminal Monetary Penalties · 
DEFENDANT: MEDINA-GUTIERREZ, ERNESTO Judgment-Page 3 of 4 
CASE NUMBER; CR I 0-389-MA 
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENAL TIES 
The defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary penalties in accordance wilh the Schedule of Payments set forth 
in this Judgment: 
Assessment Restitution TOTAL 
(as noted on Sheet ll 
TOTALS $10.00 $0.00 $10.00 
] The determination of:restitvtion is deferred until -------·· An Amended Ju<lgment in a Criminal Case will be 
entered after such determination. 
( ] The defend.ant shall make restitution (including oommunity restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below. 
If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shaH receive an approximately proportioned pa)llllent, unless specified 
otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(1), all non· 
federal victims must be paid in full prior to the United States receiving payment 
Priority Order 
Name of P@yee TQtal Amount gf Los§• 
Amount of Restitution 
Qrdmd or Percenta1e ol PaYf!IPt 
$ 
TOTALS 
( ] If applicable, restitution ammmt ordered pursuant to pka agreement $·-~-----
[ ] The defendant shall pay interest on any fine or restitlltion of more tban $2,500, unless the fine or restitution is paid in fWl 
befo:re the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to l 8 U .S.C. § 3612(1). All of the payment options on the 
Schedule of Paymcm1s may be subject to penalti~ for delinquency and default, purswmt to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g}. 
J The court detennined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and :it is ordered that 
[ ] the interest requirement is waived for the [ ) fine and/or ( ] restitution. 
[ ] tbe interest requirement for the [ ) fine and/or [ ] restitution is modified as foJJows: 
Any payment shall be divided proportkmatdy lllllOrti the payees named unless otherwise specified. 
*Fin clings for lhc total amwnt oflO§es are required under Chapten l09A, 110, llOA., snd l l.3A ofTitle JS, United Stall!S Code, for offenses c:ommiUed on 
or after Sepmnber 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996. 
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A 0 24.5B (Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 11110'8 
Sheet 6 - Schedule of Payments 
D:£FENDANT; MBDINA-OUTIERREZ. ERNESTO Judgment-Page 4 of 4 
CASE NUMBER: CR l0-.389·MA 
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS 
Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, pa)'lllent of the tQtal aimlnal monetary penalties shall be due as follows: 
A. ex l Lu.mp sum payment of$ 10.00 due immediately, balance due 
[. ) not later than or 
[ ] in accordance with [ J C or { ] D below; or 
Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C below), or B. [X} 
c. [X] If there is any unpaid halaru:e at the time of defendant's release from custody, it shall be paid in monthly installments of 
not Jess than $10.00 until paid in full, to.commence immediately upon reieme from imprisOJllllent. 
D. [ ] Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetaty penalties: 
Unless the court llas expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, it this judgment imposes a period of 
imprisonment,paymentofcriminalmonetarypenalties,inc1udingrestittttion,sbal1beduoduringtheperiodofimprisomnentasfollows: 
(1) SO% of wages earned if the defendant is participating in a prison industries program; (2) $10 per quarter if the defendant is not 
working in a prison industries program. 
It is ordered that resources received li'om any source, including inheritaru.1e, settlement. or any other judgment. shall be applied to any 
restitution or fine still owed, pursuant to IS USC § 3664(n). 
All criminal monetary penalties, including restitution, except those payments ma.do through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate 
Financial Respoosibility Program. are ma.de to the Clerk of Court at the address below, unless otherwise directed by the Court, the 
Probation Officer, or the United States Attorney. 
(X) Clerk of Court 
US DistTkt Court - Oregon 
1000SW Third Avenue 
Su.lie 740 
Portbnd, OR 97204 
J Clerk of Court 
US District Court - Oregoa 
405 J'.ssj 8111 Avenue 
Suite 2100 
Eqgeae., OR 97401 
l Clerk of Court 
US District Court- Oregt>n 
310 We»t Bhtla Street 
RoomlOI 
Medford, OR 97501 
The defendant shall receive credit fur all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed. 
I ) Joint and Several 
Case Number 
Defendant and Co~Defendant Names 
(including defendant nypibe.r) Total Amount 
(. J The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution. 
( ] The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s): 




[ 1 The .defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the fo1lowing property to the United States: 
Payments shall be applied in the foUowing order: ( l) assessment. (2) restitution principal, {3) restitution interest, ( 4) fine principal, (5) fine 
interest,, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost ofpro!le(:ution and court costs. 
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U.S. Department i, . ·; .. ·rmelau() Scc111·i11· 
Dct::ntil>n and Removal Optrations 
51 l N\V Hroadwar 
Porlland. OR 97209 
PROSECUTION REPORT 
DATE: September 28, 2010 
DEFENDANT: MEDl~A-Gutierrez, Ernesto (A 90 623 722) 
AKA(s): MEDINA, Ernesto GI MARTINEZ-Gomez, Miguel 
CITIZENSHIP: Mexico 
DA TE OF BIRTH: December 21, 1957 
PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico 
STATUTES VIOLATED: 8 USC 1326 
MANNER OF ENTRY: Unlawful (Without Inspection) 
PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown 
DATE OF ENTRY: On or after November 19, 1997 
NUMBER OF TIMES DEPORTED: l 
PLACE OF LAST DEPORT: Nogales, Arizona 
DATE OF LAST DEPORT: November 19, 1997 




FOUND OR LOCATED BY: Carol Schindele, Immigration Enforcement Agent, ICE 
DATE FOUND: September 13, 2010 
PLACE FOUND: Malheur County, Oregon 
DATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST: September 13, 2010 
DATE REVIEWED/ACCEPTED FOR PROSECUTION: September 17, 201 O 
EXHiBITL 
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(PROSEClJTION REPORT CON.TINUED) 
FBI# 517835AB4 SID# ORl 1579574 
DISTRIBUTION: Original to AUSA/Copy to A File 
CASE Officer(s}: Jacob James 
AUSA: Ryan W. Bounds 
SYNOPSIS 
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto is a citizen and native of Mexico who claims birth in Mexico. ICE 
records show that the defendant entered the United States without inspection on or after November 19, 
1997, after being deported to Mexico from the United States. ICE records indicate that the defendant was 
deported :from the United States to Mexico through Nogales, Arizona, on November 19, 1997. An 
executed Warrant of Deportation (ICE Form I-205) contained in the ICE file bearing the subject's right 
index fingerprint, records his removal to Mexico under a lawful order of deportation. 
On September 13, 2010; ICE Deportation Officer Carol Schindele located MEDINA-Gutierrez, 
Ernesto near his residence, in Malheur Counfy, Oregon. 
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto has a criminal record in the State ofidaho, consisting of the following 
conviction(s ): 
I. Convicted in the District Court of the Third Judicial District for .the State of Idaho, County of 
Payette, on or about May 04, 1995, case CR FE 9600555D. 
Count 1: Delivery of a Controlled Substance - Cocaine, in violation ofidaho Code, Section 
37-2732, which resulted in a sentence of2 years and 6 months minimum confinement and a 
subsequent indeterminate term of confinement not to exceed 2 years and 6 months, for an 
aggregate teJnl of 5 years, suspended - 5 years probation. Further ordered that defendant is to 
serve 360 days in jail with 18-0 days suspended and credit for 97 days time served. 
The Innnigration File for MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto contains a record of the following 
removals/deportations from the United States to Mexico: 
l. November 19, 1997, through Nogales, Arizona. 
On September 23, 2010, the fingerprints of MEDINA~Gutierrez, Ernesto were compared with the right 
index fingerprint memorialized on the executed Warrant of Deportation (ICE Fmm I-205), dated 
November 19, 1997, by William Jugle, a qualified fingerprint examiner, employed as a contract 
2 
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(PROSECUTION REPORT CONTINUED) 
employee with the Department of Homeland Security, Biometrics Support Center West, who detennined 
that all of the fingerprints submitted were made by the same person. 
A review of his immigration file indicated that MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto, an alien, never applied for 
or received the required consent of the Attorney General of the United States or the Secretary for the 
Department ofHomeJand Security to apply for admission into the United States after having been 
deported, in violation of Title 8 United States Code, Section 1326 (a), (b)(l), & (b)(2). 
REPORT BY: Jacob James, Deportation Officer 
REPORT DATE: September 28, 2010 
3 
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Jdaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
Mr. Medina - a citizen of Mexico lawfully entered the United States as a worker in 
1986. Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition") if 9, Exh. A & C. In December 
1990, Mr. Medina became a legal permanent resident and was given a green card that expired in 
2001. Id. Mr. Medina and his wife, Luz, have four children ranging in ages from eleven to 
twenty-four years of age, all of whom are legal pennanent residents or United States citizens. 
Petition if 8, 10. 
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In 1996, Mr. Medina was accused of delivery of a controlled substance fo the criminal 
case underlying the instant post-conviction petition. Payette County Case No. CR-FE-1996-555. 1 
With respect to the criminal charges, Mr. Medina's highest priority was to keep ms green card so 
he could continue living in the area and caring for his family. Petition~ 18. 20. Mr. Medina was 
very proud of the fact that he had no criminal history and he believed maintaining a clean record 
was important to his immigration status. Petition 1f 18. Therefore, on three occasions, Mr. 
Medina asked defense counsel if accepting a plea agreement would effect his immigration status. 
Id. On each occasion, counsel assured Mr. Medina that the plea agreement and sentence would 
not effect his green card and that he could remove the conviction from his record after 3 months. 
Id. 
Based on his attorney's assurances, Mr. Medina entered a written plea agreement with the 
state whereby he would enter an Alford plea to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. 
Petition if 18-19. The agreement indicated that Mr. Medina would be placed on probation for a 
period of five years and that as a condition of probation, he serve 360 days of jail. Affidavit of 
Counsel, Exh. A. The agreement indicated that 180 of those days would be suspended and 
served at the discretion of the probation officer. Id. The agreement further provided that Mr. 
Medina would receive credit for 97 days already served and that the remaining 83 days would be 
served with work privileges. Id. 
On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Mr. Medina in accordance with the plea 
agreement. Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. B~ C. The district court ordered Mr. Medina to report for 
1 The Register of Actions for the delivery case was attached to an affidavit submitted with 
the state's motion for summary dismissal. 
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his jail time on July 8, 1997 and to complete all rehabilitative programs required by his probation 
officer. Id. On November 19, 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico via Nogales on foot. 
Petition, Exh. D; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. F. Mr. Medina was very confused by the 
immigration proceedings and did not have a clear understanding of their outcome. Petition if 25. 
Immigration left Mr. Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated it expired in 
200 I . Petition ~ 26, Exh. A. Because Immigration did not take the green card from Mr. Medina 
and his attorney had advised him that his conviction would not effect his i.mmjgration status, he 
believed it must still be effective. Petition ~ 26. Mr. Medina presented the green card at the 
border when he returned to the United States and was allowed to enter. Id. 
In September 2010, Immigration arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United States 
unlawfully. Petition 130; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. F. Thereafter, the United States charged 
Mr. Medina in the District of Oregon with Reentry of Deported Alien in violation of8 U.S.C. 
§ l 326(a),. a felony. Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. D. Mr. Medina pied guilty to misdemeanor 
Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers and was sentenced 
to 167 days of incarceration, which he served in the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in 
Sheridan. Oregon. Petition 129; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. D. Mr. Medina is presently in 
[mmigration's custody in Tacoma, Washington pending removal from the United States. Petition 
~ l, 29. 
During consultation with attorneys fo11owing the re-entry case, Mr. Medina discovered 
that the conviction in the delivery case is considered an aggravated felony that renders him 
ineligible for any type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. Petition if 30. 
In March 2011, Mr. Medina discovered that if he had entered a guilty pJea before April l, 1997, 
3 • OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Nov 10 2011 2:47PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr•--.y, B 2083458274 page "' 
he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of the law. 
Petition if 30; see INS. v. Sr. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief 
from deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in 
April 1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea 
agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief 
at the time of their plea under the law then in effect). 
On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his attorney's incorrect 
advice concerning the effect that his plea in the delivery case would have on his status as a legal 
permanent resident. On September 22, 2011, the state filed a motion for summary disposition 
arguing that Mr. Medina's petition should be dismissed as untimely.2 As explained below. the 
state's motion should be denied. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Pertinent Legal Standard 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
Schultz v. State, 151Idaho383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011); Sparks v. State, 140 
Idaho 292, 295, 92 P .3d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 2004 ). Summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
action is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material 
fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief Amboh v. 
State, 149 Idaho 650, 651, 239 P.3d 448, 449 (Ct. App. 2010); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 
2 The petition's alleged untimeliness is the only basis on which the state seeks summary 
disposition and, thus, is the only issue addressed in this opposition. 
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272, 61 P. 3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 651, 239 P.3d at 449; Sparks, I 40 Idaho at 
295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
A petition for post-conviction re1ief may be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the detennination of appeal or from the determination of 
a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902( a). The statute of limitation 
may be equitably tolled to protect a petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful 
opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94; Leer 
v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009). 
2. The State's Motion Should Be Denied Because Mr. Medina Has Presented an Issue 
of Fact as to Whether the Time to File His Post-Conviction Relief Petition Should Be 
Equitably Tolled 
On March 31, 20 l 0, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) and held that counsel must advise non citizen clients regarding 
the risks of deportation in criminal cases. Padilla rejected the distinction between counsel's duty 
to advise regarding the collateral versus direct consequences of a guilty p1ea, a distinction which 
had been adhered to by Idaho courts. Because Padilla announced a new rule in Idaho and Mr. 
Medina's post-conviction petition would have been denied if he had filed it before the Padilla 
decision was announced, due process requires that the post-conviction statute of limitation be 
equitably tolled to give Mr. Medina a reasonable opportunity to present ills claim. Further, Mr. 
Medina's petition raises an issue of fact as to whether he brought his post-conviction claim 
within a reasonable amount of time after discovering that his attorney's advice had been 
affirmatively incorrect regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Accordingly, 
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the Court should deny the state's motion for summary disposition and set this matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
1. Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling because Padilla announced a new 
rule 
In Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 219 P.3d 1204 (Ct App. 2009), the Court of Appeals 
recognized that the announcement of a new rule could give rise to a basis to equitably toll the 
statute of limitations.3 EquitabJe tolling in post-conviction actions is borne of the petitioner's due 
process right to have a meaningfu] oppornmity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 
385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176. Where the United States 
Supreme Court announces a decision that establishes that Idaho courts had previously 
misinterpreted the law, the statute of limitations must be tolled in order to provide post-
conviction relief petitioners with a meaningful opportunity to present their claims. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Padilla established that Idaho had incorrectly 
interpreted the Sixth Amendment for more than twenty years. Had Mr. Medina timely brought 
his post-conviction claim, it would have been erroneous1y denied based on Idaho's 
misinterpretation of counsel's duties under the Sixth Amendment. Now that Padilla has 
established that Mr. Medina is entitled to relief, he must have a meaningful opportunity to 
present his post-conviction claims. 
A new rule is one not dictated by precedent existing at the time a judgment became final. 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 ( 1989); 
3 Ultimately, the Court did not apply equitable tolling based on its conclusion that the 
case at issue -Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)- did not announce a new 
ruJeoflaw. Kriebel, 148Idahoat 191,219P.3dat 1207. 
6 • OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
75 
Nov 10 2011 2:48PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mc'·~v, B 2083458274 page n 
Kriebel 148 Idaho at 191. 219 P.Jd at 1207. A case will be deemed to have announced a new ' . 
rule ifits outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds. Butler v. McKellar, 494 
U.S. 407, 415 (1990); Kriebel, 148 Idaho at 191, 219 P.3d at 1207. The explicit overruling of an 
ear]ier holding no doubt creates a new rule. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416; Kriebel~ 148 Idaho at 
191, 219 P.3d at 1207. 
Immigration consequences have been considered collateral, rather than direct, to a guilty 
plea. For over twenty years the Idaho courts indicated that the Sixth Amendment contains no 
duty for a criminal attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences. See Ray v. State, 133 
Idaho 96, 102 982 P.2d 931, 937 (1999) (holding that the Sixth Amendment contains no implied 
duty for an attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Retamoza v. 
State, 125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-08 {Ct. App. 1994) (stating it had previously 
adopted "'the rule recognized by many other jurisdictions that the Sixth Amendment implies no 
duty for an attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Jones v. 
State, 118 Idaho 842. 844, 801 P .2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that failure to inform of 
collateral consequences does not rise to the constitutional threshold of ineffective assistance of 
counsel); LaBarge v.State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59~ 62 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating the 
Sixth Amendment imposes no duty on counsel to inform his client of such collateral 
consequences of the guilty plea); Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 469, 776 P.2d 830, 831 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (noting that numerous jurisdictions have held that the Sixth Amendment contain no 
implied duty for an attorney to inform cJient of collateral consequences of a guilty plea). 
The Padilla Court expressly rejected the collateral/direct consequences distinction as it 
relates to the advice concerning immigration consequences that attorneys must provide, holding: 
7 • OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
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Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close 
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct 
or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus 
ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of 
deportation. We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically 
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. 
The rule announced in Padilla was not dictated by Idaho precedent existing at the time 
Mr. Medina's judgment became final. Indeed, the precedent existing at that time dictated the 
opposite result, that his petition be denied because counsel did not have an obligation to infonn 
of immigration consequences. See Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 796-97. 874 P .2d at 607-08. 
Now that the United States Supreme Court has corrected Idaho's understanding of the 
scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, Mr. Medina must be given a 
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his 
post-conviction relief petition began anew when Padilla was decided. Mr. Medina filed his post-
conviction relief petition within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr. 
Medina's petition as untimely should be denied. 
2. Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling because be brought the instant 
post-conviction relief petition within a reasonable time of discovering the 
factual basis for his claim 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would 
prec]ude courts from considering claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the 
time limit, yet raise important due process issues. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250. 220 
P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05, 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 
(2007). Unknown claims must be brought within a ":reasonable time" after their discovery and 
courts determine what is reasonable on a case by case basis. id. Generally, ineffective assistance 
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of counsel claims should be known after trial because the facts of the case are particularly within 
the knowledge of the defendant. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P .3d at 1072. 
Here, counsel repeatedly assured Mr. Medina that his guilty plea would not effect his 
immigration status. Further, the plea agreement expressly contemplated that Mr. Medina remain 
in the country by providing for work release and that Mr. Medina participate in rehabilitative 
programs and complete probation while residing in Oregon. Mr. Medina did not understand the 
immigration proceedings concerning his deportation in 1997 and immigration officials left Mr. 
Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated that it expired in 200 I. Because 
Immigration did not take the green card from Mr. Medina and his attorney had advised him that 
his conviction would not effect his immigration status, he believed it must still be effective. Mr. 
Medina presented the green card at the border when he returned to the United States and was 
allowed to enter. 
It was not until September 2010, when Immigration arrested Mr. Medina for being in the 
United States unlawfu1ly, that Mr. Medina realized that the advice of his attorney was defective. 
Mr. Medina discovered that not only was his attomey•s advice incorrect when he told Mr. 
Medina the guilty plea would not effect his green card, Mr. Medina discovered that the type of 
crime that he pJed guilty to is considered an aggravated felony that renders him ineligible for any 
type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. Worse yet, had his attorney 
researched the applicable law and arranged for Mr. Medina to enter his guilty plea only days 
earlier, Mr. Medina could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of 
the law. See !NS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief from 
deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April 
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1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and 
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of 
their plea under the law then in effect). 
Because Mr. Medina's green card was left in his possession, he was unaware that his 
attorney had given him materially incorrect advice regarding the immigration consequences for 
many years. He filed the instant petition approximately 6 months after being arrested for illegal 
re-entry, during which time he was incarcerated out of state. Mr. Medina has presented an issue 
of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim within a reasonable time following its 
discovery and the Court should deny the state's motion for summary dismissal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Medina has presented an issue of fact establishing that he is entitled to equitable 
tolling. Accordingly, the state's motion for summary disposition should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this lcf'> day of November, 2011. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
4.c_BY~~ 
Rob e 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI DISTRICT OF THE~----·~. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO.: CV2011-319 
Plaintiff, ) 
) REPLY TO OBJECTION FOR MOTION FOR 
V. ) SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
) 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Anne-Marie Kelso Prosecuting Attorney, and replies as follows: 
Idaho Code Section 19-4902 provides that " [a ]n application may be filed at any time within 
one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding 
following an appeal, whichever is later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the one-year 
limitation should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis 
for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001); 
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct.App.2003). In Idaho, equitable tolling 
of the statute oflimitations for filing a post-conviction relief petition has only been recognized: 
(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction 
without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and (2) where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from 
Reply-I 
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction. See Leer v. State 148 Idaho 113 (2009); Shultz v. 
State 151 Idaho 383 (2011); Amboh v. State 149 Idaho 650 (2010). 
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit, in US v. Hong, No. 10-6294 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) 
has decided that the Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky does not apply to the benefit of 
defendants whose conviction was final before the decision was handed down. The court held 
that "Chang Hong seeks to appeal the district court's denial of his motion for relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 as untimely. He asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his 
counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea as required by 
Padilla . .. We find Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law, but it does not apply retroactively 
to cases on collateral review. Therefore, Hong's§ 2255 motion was untimely, and we conclude 
Hong has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that Padilla does not apply retroactively. Chaidez v. 
United States (No. 10-3623). The Court concluded that because Padilla announced a new 
constitutional rule, that unless there is an exception to retroactively applying the case, Padilla 
will not apply to cases already resolved on appeal. In addition, the Third District Court of Appeal 
of the State of Florida in Hernandez v. Florida (No. 3D10-2462) (April 2011) has sided with the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits on the issue, leaving it open for the Eleventh Circuit to make a 
decision on the case if it goes up on appeal to that court. 1 
Furthermore, even if the Court finds that equitable tolling should occur, the Defendant 
admits that he suspected his green card was no longer valid in 2000, so he avoided reapplication. 
In addition, the Padilla decision was announced in March of 2010, and the Defendant, knowing 
his green card was likely invalid, still waited another year before filing the post conviction. 
I The Third Circuit ruling in United States v. Orocio, No. I 0-123 I (3d Cir. June 29, 20 I I) is the first U. S. Court of Appeals to 
apply Padilla v. Kentucky retroactively. 
Reply-2 
DATED this 17th of November, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this J 7 day of November, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be forward~ith all required charges prepaid, by the method (s) 
indicated below, to the person (s) listed below: 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY and BARTLETT 
303 West Bannock 
PO Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
345-8274 
Hand Delivery D U.S. Mail D 
Reply-4 
/ 
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNESTO 
MEDINA JR. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, Ernesto Medina Jr., being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That the Petitioner in this case, Ernesto G. Medina Sr., is my father. I am over the age 
of eighteen and make the following statements from personal knowledge. 
2. Following my father's arrest by immigration in September, 2010, he was taken to the 
Elmore County Jail in Mountain Home. I did not understand why my father had been arrested or 
what was required to assist him. Long-time family friend Shelly Roberts and I contacted a 
lawyer in Boise, Idaho by the name of Ernest Hoidal to see if he could represent my father. Mr. 
Hoidal was provided payment and we understood that he would tell us within four hours whether 
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he could assist my father. However, when Mr. Hoidal arrived at the jail to see Mr. Medina, he 
was told that he would need to return with paperwork. By the time Mr. Hoidal returned to the 
jail with the paperwork the next day, Mr. Medina had already been moved from Elmore County 
to Multnomah County in Portland, Oregon. 
3. After my father contacted Ms. Roberts to get information regarding his case, we 
stopped dealing with Mr. Hoidal and contacted an attorney in Portland, David Shomloo, on Mr. 
Hoidal' s recommendation. By the time we contacted Mr. Shomloo, my father had been moved to 
Tacoma, Washington. Because the Tacoma facility was an immigration facility, we looked for 
an immigration lawyer to see my father in Tacoma. We found a local lawyer that would often 
visit the facility to speak with other clients. However, this attorney informed us that my father 
needed a criminal lawyer for his case. 
4. My father was then moved back to Portland and we again contacted Mr. Shomloo. 
We came to understand that my father was charged with illegally re-entering the country because 
there was a problem with his immigration status. Mr. Shomloo was hesitant to take my father's 
case because it was very complicated. Ultimately, Mr. Shomloo agreed to help. We were then 
informed that an attorney from the federal defender's office had been appointed to represent my 
father. 
5. Mr. Shomloo offered to assist the federal defender however, the federal defender 
declined. Mr. Shomloo informed us that we needed to wait until the federal criminal case was 
complete in order for him to assist my father with his immigration case. 
6. In December, 2010, my father was sent to the federal prison in Sheridan, Oregon to 
serve his sentence. In late January 2011, Mr. Shomloo told us that the problem with my father's 
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immigration status was a result of an old conviction in Idaho. Mr. Shomloo instructed us to find 
a post-conviction attorney in Idaho in order to help my father. 
7. We then searched on the internet for post conviction lawyers in Idaho and after 
multiple calls, we were given the number of Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay & Bartlett LLP. In early 
February, 2011, we met with Robyn Fyffe and retained her services to represent my father in a 
post conviction case. Due to communication difficulties with Mr. Shomloo, we retained Maria 
Andrade in Idaho to assist in representing my father in immigration matters. My father has been 
incarcerated in Tacoma, Washington as a result of the immigration hold since finishing his 
sentence in Sheridan in March of 2011. Although bail was set in July, we have not been able to 
afford my father's release. 
8. Throughout this ordeal, Ms. Roberts and I have been working together to assist my 
father in getting information to and from the lawyers. Communication with the attorneys and my 
father has been difficult- a situation aggravated by my father's multiple moves from various 
detention facilities. We relied on the advice of attorneys that we needed to wait until the re-entry 
case was finished in order to address my father's immigration problem. As soon as we 
discovered that the immigration problem was caused by the Idaho conviction, we searched for an 
attorney who could file a post-conviction action. 
9. Based on multiple conversations with my father concerning his immigration status 
over the years before his arrest, I do not believe my father understood that the fact he had been 
returned to Mexico by immigration officials was a true "deportation" because his green card and 
driver's license were left in his possession. I also do not believe that my father has ever 
understood the effect the Idaho conviction had on his immigration papers. 
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This ends my affidavit. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this q day of December, 2011, I caused a true and 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
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303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorney for Petitioner 
County, Idaho 
c 0 9 2011 
-----A.M. P.M. 
BETTY J. DRESSEN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTIN BROWN 
1. I am a legal assistant in the firm of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP. 
2. I currently manage attorney Robyn Fyffe's cases and am assigned as her legal 
assistant. 
3. Beginning on or about February 23, 2011, I attempted to locate Mr. Ernesto Medina's 
physical location so that Robyn Fyffe could discuss his case. I was told on numerous occasions 
that Mr. Medina was in transport and the Federal Prison Facility in Sheridan, Oregon would not 
confirm for me he was being detained there. I placed several phone calls to FCl Sheridan over 
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the next two weeks attempting to set up a telephone call with Mr. Medina. It was not until 
March 18, 2011, that I was able to arrange for a call with Mr. Medina and Robyn Fyffe. In the 
approximately three weeks that I spent corresponding with the Federal Prison in Oregon, I left 
multiple voicemails for both staff sergeants and inmate mail personnel in an attempt to contact 
Mr. Medina. My calls were almost never returned, and if they were, I was told correspondence 
must be in writing to an inmate, that attorney telephone calls must be requested in writing. Ms. 
Fyffe sent Mr. Medina a letter on March 3, 2011. However, this letter did not result in Mr. 
Medina being able to speak with Ms. Fyffe. After Mr. Medina's telephone call with his attorney, 
Robyn Fyffe, letters were sent to him via Fedex on March 23, 2011 and April 1, 2011 in regards 
to this case. 
This ends my Affidavit 
Dated this Cft4day of December, 2011. 
-Kr-~.!..is...:t:__in-=B::::!...:ro:__w_n-=---+~......l...J~J.A...A.~c::::::===---
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to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
DEC 2011 
BETTY J, DRESSEN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 









Petitioner, CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
vs. AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Ernesto G. Medina, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am the Petitioner in the above-titled case. 
2. I re-affirm the truth of those statements in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
("Petition"), which are within my personal knowledge. Specifically, I re-affirm Paragraphs 8-31. 
3. As described in the Petition, I lawfully emigrated to the United States in 1986 and became a 
legal permanent resident in 1990. My wife, Luz, and our growing family lived in the Ontario, Oregon 
area since coming to the United States. Keeping my green card and being able to continue caring for my 
wife and four children in the Ontario area has been - and is - the most important aspect of my life. I 
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knew that having a clean criminal record was an important part of keeping my green card and was very 
proud of the fact that in all the years I had been in this country, I had only received a ticket for driving 
without a seatbelt in 1990. 
4. One day in 1995, I agreed to give a ride to a person I knew named Roberto, who was married 
to my niece. We went to a store and I bought a drink. On my way to Ontario, I was stopped and 
arrested. I had no idea what was going on and I thought perhaps they thought I had not paid for my 
drink. I later found out I was being accused of delivering drugs. 
5. I could not afford to bond out and my wife became very mentally ill. She was unable to care 
for our children and was taken to the hospital. A friend finally paid for my bond. The people that 
worked in the hospital and for Health and Welfare wanted my wife to go to a place for the mentally ill in 
Pendleton, Oregon, but I convinced them to put her into my care instead. My wife saw doctors who treat 
mental illness and gave her medicine but it did not do her any good. 
6. My charges were dismissed. I was told that there had been an error. 
7. My wife's condition continued to be very bad and we went to Mexico to see if a doctor there 
could help her. We drove from Ontario to Colima, Mexico, where Luz saw a doctor who gave her 
medicine. After two months, we returned to Ontario and she continued her treatment with the doctors 
there. 
8. I obtained work at the Amour meat packing plant in Nampa. One day I was called to the 
office and arrested. I had no idea why. My attorney, David Posey, told me that I was being accused of 
delivering drugs again and I told him that they were confused and there must be a mistake. 
9. I desperately wanted out of jail so that I could help my wife, who continued to be very ill and 
had a great deal of difficulty coping with my incarceration. Mr. Posey told me that ifl pled guilty, I 
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could get out of jail and I would have to serve an additional 22 days in jail during which I would be 
allowed to leave during the day to work. As also described in the Petition, I asked Mr. Posey whether 
pleading guilty would effect my immigration papers. As I have said, I had a very clean record and 
keeping my papers and green card was the most important thing to me. Mr. Posey told me that he was 
sure I would not have problems with my papers ifI pled guilty. Mr. Posey told me that in three months, 
he would submit a request to clear my record and that it would then be clean again. Mr. Posey assured 
me several times that there would be no problem with my papers if I pled guilty. I relied on this advice 
in accepting the plea deal described in the Petition. I was not guilty of delivery of drugs but since Mr. 
Posey told me there would be no problem with my papers and my record and my wife was very sick, I 
decided the best thing to do was to plead guilty. 
10. After reporting to serve my sentence, I spent six days sleeping in the jail and leaving at 5 :00 
a.m. and returning at 10 p.m. The next day, I was not allowed to leave because immigration had come 
for me. I said there was a mistake because Mr. Posey had said there would be no problem. I was not 
allowed to call Mr. Posey before immigration came for me. 
11. I spent approximately three months in a detention facility in Arizona, during which time I 
went to an immigration court approximately two times. I did not have an attorney, there were a lot of' 
people and the officials talked very fact. I did not understand what happened. I was taken to the border 
in a vehicle with other people and sent across the border. Immigration had taken the green cards and 
licenses of other people who I know who were deported. I thought perhaps there was a mistake after al1 
and that my immigration papers were still good. This belief was re-affirmed when I presented the green 
card at the border and was permitted to enter the United States. 
12. I returned to the Ontario area and continued working and supporting my family. Then one 
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day in September, 2010, I was arrested at work. At first I thought perhaps I was arrested because I had 
not renewed my green card. I spent four or five days in Mountain Home and was then taken to 
Pendeleton, Oregon, where I stayed only about forty minutes. I spent a night in The Dalles, Oregon, and 
then a few hours in Portland, Oregon. I was then taken to Tacoma, Washington, where I stayed four 
days and then to Sheridan, Oregon, where I remained for 167 days. I came to understand that I had been 
charged with illegally re-entering the United States. 
13. Finally, in January, 2011, I was told that the problem with my immigration papers was the 
conviction from Payette, Idaho, and that I needed to find an attorney to do a post-conviction petition in 
Idaho. The Idaho attorneys who were hired to help me, Ms. Fyffe and Maria Andrade, explained to me 
that the Idaho conviction is an "aggravated felony" that means my green card can never be renewed. 
Although I began to suspect there was a problem with my green card before my arrest, I never 
understood that the advice Mr. Posey gave me was completely false. 
This ends my affidavit. 
Ernesto Gutierrez Medina 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this __ day 
Notary Public for the State of Washington 
Residing at:---------
My commission expires: ____ _ 
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SS. 
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That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
That I am counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned case. 
That I am conversant in the Spanish language. 
Mr. Medina is presently being detained in the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma, 
Washington. It takes several weeks to receive a document that I send to Mr. Medina to be 
reviewed and notarized. 
I drafted the instant Affidavit based on information that Mr. Medina provided to me in a 
letter written in Spanish. I thereafter reviewed the contents of this Affidavit with Mr. 
Medina by telephone and he affirmed that the contents therein are true and correct. 
I mailed the foregoing Affidavit in order to obtain Mr. Medina's notarized signature. 
However, I anticipate it will be several weeks before the signed Affidavit arrives via U.S. 
mail. 
I will file the notarized Affidavit up~ 
Robyn Fyffe 
........ ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befoi;,e·~\~.;.~.f~~ of December, 2011. 
~~,,·· ~~ .... f ~ l _,nTA~ · \-t- \ .. ,. ~- ,. : 
AAp+w\YV\ Q_A l ;r-t- -·- I ·! --=--'--'o<-L:l->=~-~-+~-+~--=:-~ 1. \ Pf.J \ c I :: 
Notary Public for Idaho \ tP:. B\.. •• •0 l 
My commission expires: ~ 6 '\1/..,'';,••· .. ··~·~~ ...... :-
l',,« '11 OF\ ,, .. .. , .............. .. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this J_ day of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As described more fully in Mr. Medina's initial opposition to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, Mr. Medina decided to accept a plea offer after his attorney specifically 
advised him that the Afford plea to delivery of a controlled substance would not impact his status 
as a legal permanent resident. Relying on this advice, Mr. Medina entered an A?ford plea to 
delivery of a controlled substance on April 14, 1997. 
1 • SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Thirteen years later, in September, 2010, Mr. Medina was arrested by immigration and 
charged with illegal re-entry. He thereafter discovered that his attorney's advice had been grossly 
incorrect and rather than having no impact on his immigration status, the delivery charge is 
considered an aggravated felony that renders him permanently ineligible for any type of relief 
from deportation. Petition~ 30. Mr. Medina also discovered that if he had entered a guilty plea 
before April 1, 1997, he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under a prior version 
of the law. Petition~ 30. 
On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he relied on his attorney's 
incorrect advice concerning the effect that his plea in the delivery case would have on his status 
as a legal permanent resident. On September 22, 2011, the state filed a motion for summary 
disposition arguing that Mr. Medina's petition should be dismissed as untimely. Mr. Medina 
opposed the state's motion and the state submitted a reply. At the hearing on the state's motion, 
on November 23, 2011, the district court offered Mr. Medina the opportunity to provide 
additional briefing in response to the state's reply. Mr. Medina accepted and offers the following 
argument explaining why the state's motion should be denied. 
II. ARGUMENT 
In opposition to the state's motion to dismiss his petition as untimely, Mr. Medina argued 
that in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), the United States Supreme Court conected 
Idaho's unreasonable understanding of the scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment. Thus, the limitation period for Mr. Medina to file his post-conviction relief petition 
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did not begin to run until Padilla was announced in order to provide Mr. Medina with a 
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Mr. Medina filed his post-conviction relief petition 
within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr. Medina's petition as untimely 
should be denied. Additionally, Mr. Medina brought his post-conviction action within a 
reasonable time of discovering that his attorney's advice was affirmatively incorrect and 
misleading and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The state replied and argued that although Padilla announced a new rule oflaw, it is not 
retroactively applicable and thus does not provide a basis to equitably toll the time for Mr. 
Medina to file his post-conviction action. The state further argued that Mr. Medina began to 
suspect his attorney's advice was incorrect in 2000, when he did not attempt to renew his green 
card, and that it was unreasonable to file the petition until nearly a year after Padilla was decided. 
Whether Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral review - and whether the law 
announced in that decision thus applies to Mr. Medina's case - is distinct from whether Mr. 
Medina is entitled to equitable tolling. Pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), an "old 
rule" applies on both direct and collateral review whereas a "new rule" is retroactively applicable 
to cases on collateral review if: ( 1) the new rule places certain kinds of criminal conduct beyond 
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe; or (2) the new rule is a watershed 
rule of criminal procedure that alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that 
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction. See also United States v. Orocio, 
645 F.3d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Padilla's holding falls strictly within the confines of prior United States Supreme Court 
precedent and is therefore a retroactively applicable "old rule" under the Teague doctrine. 
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637. Accordingly, Mr. Ernesto benefits from the law announced in that 
opinion although it was announced after his conviction became final. 
Distinct from retroactivity is whether the one-year statute of limitation was equitably 
tolled. A number of jurisdictions recognize that the announcement of a new rule that meets the 
Teague standard for retroactivity provides a basis for equitable tolling. See e.g. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
2255(f)(3) (one year period of limitation for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his 
conviction and sentence via a habeas application runs from "the date on which the right asserted 
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 9-14-42(c)(3) (post-conviction statute of limitations begins to run when new retroactively rule 
is announced); 15 M.R.S.A. § 2128(5)(B)(same); Neb.Rev.St.§ 29-3001(4)(d) (same); T.C.A. § 
40-30-102 (same). Should this Court determine that Padilla announced a new rule for purposes 
of Teague, it should also conclude that it is retroactively applicable as a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure. 
However, Mr. Medina's primary argument concerning equitable tolling is not grounded in 
Teague. Rather, despite established Supreme Comi precedent that dictated Padilla's result, 
Idaho's prior jurisprudence foreclosed Mr. Medina's claims by holding that counsel's duties did 
not extend to the obligation to provide correct advice concerning the immigration consequences 
flowing from a conviction because those consequences are "collateral" to the criminal 
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proceedings. Now that Idaho's unreasonable interpretation of the Sixth Amendment has been 
corrected, due process requires that Mr. Medina be provided with a meaningful opportunity to 
present his claim. The considerations restricting retroactive application of new rules are not 
applicable in these circumstances and, therefore, Idaho's misapplication of established Supreme 
Court precedent entitles Mr. Medina to equitable tolling without demonstrating that Padilla is a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure. Moreover, Mr. Medina brought this action within one year 
of Padilla, notwithstanding significant barriers to his doing so since September, 2010, and he 
therefore initiated this action within a reasonable time after the basis to do so arose. 
Finally, Mr. Medina did not discover that his prior conviction resulted in the mandatory 
and permanent loss of his immigration status in this country- and thus that his attorney's advice 
was affirmatively misleading- until after his arrest in September, 2010. Thereafter, he and his 
family and friends diligently sought to discover the best way to address the issue and Mr. Medina 
has presented an issue of fact as to whether he brought the instant action within a reasonable 
amount of time following the discovery of counsel's ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the 
state's motion for summary dismissal should be denied and this matter should be set for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
A. Padilla Is Retroactively Applicable 
In Teague, the Supreme Court established "two regimes governing the retroactive 
application of constitutional principles to criminal cases" by dividing "the world into two 
categories, 'old rules' and 'new rules."' Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637. A rule is a "new rule" for 
Teague purposes if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
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conviction became final - "new rules" under Teague only apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review if one of two narrow exceptions apply. Id. By contrast, a rule is "old," and thus 
retroactively applicable on collateral review, if a court considering the defendant's claim at the 
time his conviction became final should have been compelled by existing precedent to conclude 
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution. United States v. Chang Hong, Dock. No. 
10-6294, F.3d 2011 WL 3805763, 5 (10th Cir. 2011). 
1. Padilla's result was dictated by Supreme Court precedent 
Jurisdictions that had rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure 
to provide correct advice concerning immigration consequences concluded the Sixth Amendment 
did not impose a duty for counsel to advise regarding "collateral" consequences. However, 
Padilla made clear that it had never subscribed to a distinction between collateral and direct 
consequences. Instead, Padilla straightforwardly applied prior precedent in concluding that 
correct information concerning immigration consequences was the kind of important information 
necessary for alien defendants to make knowing decisions during the plea process. Because 
Padilla flowed directly from prior precedent and established professional norms, it is a 
retroactively applicable "old rule." 
In Orocio, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "Padilla followed directly 
from [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] and long-established professional norms" 
and is therefore "an 'old rule' for Teague purposes and is retroactively applicable on collateral 
review." Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641. While "the precise question of whether the civil removal 
consequences of a plea are within the scope of Strickland had never been addressed by the 
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Supreme Court before Padilla" the question is "whether counsel has been constitutionally 
adequate in advising a criminal defendant whether to accept a plea bargain." Id. at 637-38. The 
Orocio Court further noted that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court held 
that the Strickland two-part standard applies to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the 
plea process and courts must determine whether counsel's advice to accept a plea was within the 
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The Orocio Court explained: 
The application of Strickland to the Padilla scenario is not so removed 
from the broader outlines of precedent as to constitute a "new rule," for the Court 
Juul Jong requiretl effective assistance of counsel on all "important decisions," 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, in plea bargaining that could "affect[ ] the outcome of 
the plea process," Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In that light, Padilla is best read as merely 
recognizing that a plea agreement's immigration consequences constitute the 
sort of information an alien defendant needs in making "important decisions" 
affecting "the outcome of the plea process," and thereby come within the ambit 
of the "more particular duties to consult with the defendant" required of effective 
counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Far from extending the Strickland rule into 
uncharted territory, Padilla reaffirmed defense counsel's obligations to the 
criminal defendant during the plea process, a critical stage in the proceedings. 
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 638 (emphasis added). This reasoning is illustrated by Mr. Medina's 
situation. Notwithstanding its status as a so-called collateral consequence, information regarding 
the immigration consequences to Mr. Medina's Alford plea was the single most important aspect 
of his decision to plead guilty. His attorney's misleading advice that the plea would not effect his 
status most certainly affected the plea process and correct advice regarding the consequences was 
"the sort of information" Mr. Medina needed to make an informed decision to plead guilty. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California reasoned: 
When the Supreme Court applies a well-established rule oflaw in a new way 
based on the specific facts of a pmiicular case, it does not generally establish a 
new rule. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1992) (where application 
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of a prior rule of law did not "break new ground," it was not a new rule); Turner 
v. Williams, 3 5 F .3d 872, 885 (4th Cir.1994) ... The issue before the Supreme 
Court in Padilla was whether defense counsel's performance met the first prong of 
the Strickland test-that is, whether it "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
The Strickland test for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is an old, 
well-established rule oflaw. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) 
("It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as 'clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.' "). 
United States v. Hubenig, Dock. No. 6:03-mj-040 2010 WL 2650625, 5 (E.D.Cal. July 1, 2010); 
see also People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. 2011) (Padilla Court simply expanded 
Strickland to include counsel's obligation to inform a defendant of possible deportation 
consequences. A decision that applies an established general rule (Strickland) to a new set of 
facts (deportation) is not a new rule); Denisyuk v. State,_ A.3d_, 2011 WL 5042332 (Md. 
2011) (agreeing that Strickland set forth a general standard for application to a specific set of 
facts and that Padilla is an application of Strickland to a specific set of facts); Commonwealth v. 
Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 2011) (Padilla retroactive because the two-part Strickland 
test provides a general standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, such 
claims present the sort of case-by-case application of a general standard that will rarely create a 
"new rule"); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, Dock. No. 01-10-00627-CR, S.W.3d _, _, 2011 
WL 2132722, at *5-6 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011) (Padilla was reasoned like most Strickland 
cases as the Supreme Court merely cited to professional standards and expectations and 
identified competent counsel's duty in accordance thereof). 
The state relies on Chang Hong and Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 
2011) in support of its contention that Padilla announced a new rule. These courts concluded 
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that Padilla created a new rule because "a reasonable jurist" would not have considered Supreme 
Court precedent as compelling its result and prior cases holding contrary to Padilla were not 
unreasonable. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 691-92; Chang Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *5-7. These 
courts relied on the fact that a number of jurisdictions had applied the collateral versus direct 
consequence distinction in concluding that Strickland and Hill did not compel Padilla's result. 
However, the fact that Padilla overruled the precedent of lower courts is not dispositive 
of whether it established a new rule for Teague purposes. See Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, 5; 
Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-6; see also Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 
1135, 1143 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (although the Court resolved a Circuit split in Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), that fact alone does not imply that the Court announced a 
new constitutional rule). Rather, the determination of whether a new rule is created is objective 
and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new. 
Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, 5; Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-6. 
The Chang Hong Court acknowledged the reasons supporting the conclusion that Padilla 
is not a new rule - that it did not overturn any of the Court's prior precedent, that it is grounded in 
Strickland and that, even before Padilla was decided, the Court had already recognized the 
importance of considering potential immigration consequences when entering into a plea 
agreement. It nevertheless noted that many jurisdictions had relied on the collateral versus direct 
consequence distinction. Rather than analyze whether such an interpretation is objectively 
reasonable, the Court indicated: "All of these courts-including our own-thought the rule in 
Padilla was not dictated or compelled by Court precedent. It goes without saying these are some 
of the 'reasonable jurists' we must survey to determine if Padilla is a new rule." 
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Thus, the Chang Hong Court's holding appears to be grounded in the Court's hesitation 
to entertain the idea that it had established a rule despite Supreme Court precedent dictating a 
contrary result and did not rest on sound, legal analysis. Similarly, the Chaidez Court 
acknowledged that the task of determining Padilla's retroactivity was a "difficult" one because 
Padilla merely extended the reasoning of prior cases as opposed to explicitly overruling an 
earlier holding. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689. The Court relied on the existence of case law 
reaching a result contrary to Padilla while acknowledging that "the mere existence of conflicting 
authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new." Id. at 691, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 410 (2000). It then held that an objective reading of the relevant cases demonstrates 
that Padilla was not dictated by precedent. 
Padilla clearly indicated that the Supreme Court had "never applied a distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' required under Strickland." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481 (emphasis added). Given that 
meaningful advice concerning immigration consequences to a plea is the single most important 
aspect of the decision to accept a plea bargain for most non-citizen defendants, the imposition of 
such a distinction was an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill. 
Padilla flowed from the clearly established principles of the guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland and Hill required counsel to advise criminal defendants at the 
plea stage in accordance with precedent and prevailing professional norms to ensure that the 
defendant makes an informed, knowing and voluntary decision whether to plead guilty. Padilla 
is set within the confines of Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give 
to a criminal defendant at the plea stage, and did not establish a new rule. 
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Watershed rule of criminal procedure 
Even if this Court concludes that Padilla is a "new rule" for purposes of Teague, it should 
nevertheless conclude it is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that alters our understanding of 
the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction. Thus, Padilla is retroactively applicable and provides a basis for equitable tolling. 
For lawful immigrants such as Mr. Medina, who are accused of committing crimes, 
meaningful advice on the potential effect of their decisions on their immigration status is critical 
to entering knowing and intelligent pleas. Although Mr. Medina did not believe that he was 
guilty of delivery of controlled substance, he entered the Alford plea believing it was the best way 
to maintain his freedom so he could care for his sick wife and their children. Instead, the plea 
has effectuated his permanent exile from this country and from his family and friends. Correct 
immigration advice implicates the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings and should be 
retroactively applied even if a new rule. 
B. Mr. Medina Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling Because Padilla Announced a New Rule 
in Idaho 
Although Padilla's result was dictated by Strickland and Hill, it was foreclosed by Idaho 
jurisprudence. Thus, as argued in Mr. Medina's initial opposition to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, the statute oflimitations must be tolled in order to allow Mr. Medina a 
meaningful opportunity to present his claims now that Idaho's unreasonable application of the 
Sixth Amendment has been corrected by Padilla. Further, as established above, Padilla is 
retroactively applicable for purposes of Teague. In cases such as this one where the state court 
unreasonably applied Supreme Court jurisprudence, the reasoning underlying the Teague 
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doctrine's limitation on retroactive application of new rules does not apply. Accordingly, Mr. 
Medina is entitled to equitable tolling without demonstrating that Padilla announced a watershed 
rule of criminal procedure. 
1. Padilla is a new rule under Idaho law 
The explicit overruling of an earlier holding undoubtedly creates a new rule. Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. As noted in Mr. Medina's initial 
memorandum, Idaho courts held that the Sixth Amendment contains no duty for a criminal 
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences. See Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 102 982 
P.2d 931, 937 (1999) (holding that the Sixth Amendment contains no implied duty for an 
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Retamoza v. State, 125 
Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-08 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating it had previously adopted "the 
rule recognized by many other jurisdictions that the Sixth Amendment implies no duty for an 
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Jones v. State, 118 Idaho 
842, 844, 801 P.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that failure to inform of collateral 
consequences does not rise to the constitutional threshold of ineffective assistance of counsel); 
LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating the Sixth 
Amendment imposes no duty on counsel to inform his client of such collateral consequences of 
the guilty plea); Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 469, 776 P.2d 830, 831 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting 
that numerous jurisdictions have held that the Sixth Amendment contain no implied duty for an 
attorney to inform client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea). 
The Padilla Court expressly rejected the collateral/direct consequences distinction as it 
relates to the advice concerning immigration consequences that attorneys must provide and, thus, 
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expressly overrules Idaho's previous holdings. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. Further, the 
Supreme Court clearly indicated that it had never sanctioned some distinction between collateral 
and direct consequences. Id. Rather, relying on Strickland and Hill, the Court explained that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to a reasonably competent attorney who can provide information 
needed to make important decisions affecting the outcome of the plea process. The rule 
announced in Padilla was not dictated by Idaho precedent existing at the time Mr. Medina's 
judgment became final. 
If Mr. Medina had timely brought his post-conviction petition, it would have been 
erroneously denied as a result ofldaho's unreasonable limitation on Strickland and Hill. Now 
that the United States Supreme Comi has overruled Idaho's jurisprudence concerning the scope 
of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, Mr. Medina must be given a 
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his 
post-conviction relief petition began anew when Padilla was decided. Mr. Medina filed his post-
conviction relief petition within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr. 
Medina's petition as untimely should be denied. 
2. Teague doctrine concerns do not apply when a state court misapplies 
established Supreme Court precedent and Mr. Medina therefore is not 
required to show that Padilla is a watershed rule of criminal procedure 
As discussed above, the federal habeas statute and several statutes explicitly provide for 
equitable tolling where a new rule meets the Teague criteria for retroactive application. As 
argued above, Padilla is retroactively applicable because it was dictated by Strickland and Hill 
and is an old rule for purposes of Teague. Thus, the concerns underlying retroactive application 
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of new rules is inapplicable in this case and Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling without 
demonstrating that Padilla is a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 
In establishing the narrow exceptions to retroactive application of "new" rules, the 
Teague Court reasoned: "application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the 
operation of our criminal justice system." Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10. Retroactive application 
of new rules of constitutional law continually forces the states to defend convictions that 
conformed to constitutional standards as they existed at the time of the conviction. Id. 
States cannot be expected to anticipate new rules that are not dictated by existing 
precedent and it is therefore unfair to impose retroactive application of those rules except in 
exceptional circumstances. Conversely, states are obligated to follow the dictates of existing 
precedent and cannot complain ofretroactive application of a rule they should have been 
applying anyway. Idaho unreasonably applied established Supreme Court precedent. 
Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his post conviction petition began to run when the 
Supreme Court announced Padilla, so that Mr. Medina is afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present his claims. 
C. Mr. Medina Brought His Post-Conviction Action Within a Reasonable Time 
Following Padilla 
Even though Mr. Medina filed his post-conviction petition within one year of Padilla, the 
state implies that he delayed an unreasonably long-time in filing his petition and that it should be 
time-barred even if Padilla would otherwise entitle him to equitable tolling. However, in 
providing criminal defendants with one-year following the finality of their convictions to initiate 
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a post-conviction action, the legislature recognized one year as a reasonable amount of time to 
prepare and file a post-conviction action based on claims that existed at that time. See LC. § 
19-4902. Those statutes addressing collateral relief from criminal convictions that explicitly 
provide those circumstances in which the statute can be equitably tolled based on a retroactively 
applicable new rule recognize that the limitations period begins to run when the new rule is 
announced. See e.g. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(£)(3) (one year period of limitation for a federal 
prisoner to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence via a habeas application runs from "the 
date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court"); Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 9-14-42(c)(3) (petition for relief from conviction must be filed within four years from the date 
"on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 
or the Supreme Court of Georgia"); 15 M.R.S.A. § 2128( 5)(B)( one year limitation period runs 
from the latest of the following: "the date on which the constitutional right, state or federal, 
asserted was initially recognized"); Neb.Rev.St.§ 29-3001(4)(d) (one-year limitation period runs 
from the later of: "The date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court of the United States or the Nebraska Supreme Court"); T.C.A. § 40-30-102 
(providing court jurisdiction to consider post-conviction claims after the expiration of the 
limitations period when "the claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate 
court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial, if 
retrospective application of that right is required" in which case the petition must be filed within 
one year of the ruling of the highest court establishing the right). 
The one-year statute of limitations set forth in I.C. § 19-4902 was tolled until the United 
States Supreme Court announced it's decision in Padilla. Mr. Medina's petition was therefore 
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timely because it was brought within the one-year time period. Further, as described more fully 
below, Mr. Medina and his family and friends struggled diligently to pursue his rights in the 
months before his petition was filed despite being confronted by difficulties associated with Mr. 
Medina's federal incarceration and a confusing maze of information from multiple sources. 
Thus, even if this Court determines that the limitation period did not begin anew when Padilla 
was announced, Mr. Medina brought the petition within a reasonable time period given his 
particular circumstances. 
D. Mr. Medina Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling Because He Brought the Instant Post-
Conviction Relief Petition Within a Reasonable Time of Discovering the Factual 
Basis for His Claim 
As set forth in Mr. Medina's initial opposition, Mr. Medina did not discover that his 
attorney had provided materially misleading and incorrect advice until following his arrest by 
immigration officials in September, 2010. Following Mr. Medina's arrest, he and his family and 
friends diligently worked to discover the basis of the immigration problem and to address that 
problem. He filed the instant petition approximately six months after being arrested for illegal 
re-entry, during which time he was incarcerated out of state. Mr. Medina has presented an issue 
of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim within a reasonable time following its 
discovery and the Court should deny the state's motion for summary dismissal. 
In reply, the state noted that Mr. Medina began to suspect the green card was no longer 
good and he was afraid to apply to renew it. However, this suspicion did not lead Mr. Medina to 
believe that his attorney had provided him with affirmatively incorrect advice. Rather, he 
believed there was perhaps some confusion that would need to be resolved. Affidavit of 
Petitioner,~ 11-13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr.~ 9; and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts~ 9. Mr. 
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Medina did not understand that his attorney's advice had been entirely false and that his A{ford 
plea resulted in his permanent exclusion until well after his arrest in September, 2010. 
Further, upon learning that the Payette conviction had caused an immigration problem, 
Mr. Medina and his family and friends diligently sought to remedy the situation. Affidavit of 
Petitioner,~[ 13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. ii 2-4; and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 2-4. 
The intersection of federal criminal law, immigration law and state and federal post-conviction 
jurisprudence is confusing for most attorneys let alone lay people. Mr. Medina, his son and long-
time family friend diligently struggled to find a way to remedy Mr. Medina's situation as he was 
moved throughout the Northwest. Affidavit of Petitioner, ii 12-13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, 
Jr. if 4-8; and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 4-8. Mr. Medina's incarceration made 
communication with attorneys and families extremely difficult and hampered efforts to find the 
correct remedy. Affidavit of Petitioner, ii 12; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. if 2-8; Affidavit of 
Shelly Roberts if 2-8; and Affidavit of Kristin Brown if 3. Mr. Medina and his supporters were 
advised by attorneys to wait until the re-entry case was over to address Mr. Medina's 
immigration problems. Affidavit of Petitioner, if 13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. if 5; and 
Affidavit of Shelly Roberts if 5. Within two months of Mr. Medina's sentencing in federal court, 
they discovered that the Payette conviction was the problem and undertook finding counsel to file 
a post-conviction attorney. Affidavit of Petitioner, ir 13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. if 6-7; 
and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 6-7. Counsel filed that petition less than two months later 
notwithstanding extreme difficulties communicating with Mr. Medina. 
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Mr. Medina has presented an issue of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim 
within a reasonable time following its discovery. Accordingly, the Court should deny the state's 
motion for summary dismissal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Padilla did not announce a new rule of law under Teague and the case is therefore 
retroactively applicable to Mr. Medina's case. Further, Idaho had unreasonably applied 
Strickland and Hill in drawing a distinction between collateral and direct consequences and Mr. 
Medina's post-conviction petition would have been erroneously denied if timely filed. 
Therefore, he must be provided with a reasonable opportunity to present his claim now that Idaho 
has been conected. Mr. Medina also has presented an issue of fact establishing that he brought 
his post-conviction action within a reasonable time of discovering the basis of his claim. 
Accordingly, the state's motion for summary t?jsposition should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this _7_ day of December, 2011. 
cKA Y & BARTLETT LLP 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Robyn Fyffe 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this _J_ day of December, 2011, I caused a true and 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208)642-6096 
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHELLY 
ROBERTS 
I, Shelly Roberts, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen and make the following statements from personal 
knowledge. 
2. I was a co-worker of the Petitioner in this case, Ernesto Medina, and have been a long-
time friend of Ernesto and his family. Following Mr. Medina's arrest by immigration in 
September, 2010, he was taken to the Elmore County Jail in Mountain Home. I did not 
understand why Mr. Medina had been arrested or what was required to assist him. Mr. Medina's 
son, Junior, and I contacted a lawyer in Boise, Idaho by the name of Ernest Hoidal to see if he 
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could represent Mr. Medina. Mr. Hoidal was provided payment and we understood that he 
would tell us within four hours whether he could assist Mr. Medina. However, when Mr. Hoidal 
arrived at the jail to see Mr. Medina, he was told that he would need to return with paperwork. 
By the time Mr. Hoidal returned to the jail with the paperwork the next day, Mr. Medina had 
already been moved from Elmore County to Multnomah County in Portland, Oregon. 
3. After Mr. Medina contacted me to get information regarding his case, we stopped 
dealing with Mr. Hoidal and contacted an attorney in Portland, David Shomloo, on Mr. Hoidal' s 
recommendation. By the time we found an attorney, Mr. Medina was moved to Tacoma, 
Washington. Because the Tacoma facility was an immigration facility, we looked for an 
immigration lawyer to see Mr. Medina in Tacoma. We found a local lawyer that would often 
visit the facility to speak with other clients. However, this attorney informed us that Mr. Medina 
needed a criminal lawyer for his case. 
4. Mr. Medina was then moved back to Portland and we again contacted Mr. Shomloo. 
We came to understand that Mr. Medina was charged with illegally re-entering the country 
because there was a problem with his immigration status. Mr. Shomloo was hesitant to take Mr. 
Medina's case because it was very complicated. Ultimately, Mr. Shomloo agreed to help. We 
were then informed that an attorney from the federal defender's office had been appointed to 
represent Mr. Medina. 
5. Mr. Shomloo offered to assist the federal defender however, the federal defender 
declined. Mr. Shomloo informed us that we needed to wait until the federal criminal case was 
complete in order for him to assist Mr. Medina with his immigration case. 
6. In December, 2010, Mr. Medina was sent to the federal prison in Sheridan, Oregon to 
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serve his sentence. In late January, 2011, Mr. Shomloo told us that the problem with Mr. 
Medina's immigration status was a result of an old conviction in Idaho. Mr. Shomloo instructed 
us to find a post-conviction attorney in Idaho in order to help Mr. Medina. 
7. We then searched on the internet for post conviction lawyers in Idaho and after 
multiple calls, we were given the number of Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay & Bartlett LLP. In early 
February, 2011, we met with Robyn Fyffe and retained her services to represent Mr. Medina in a 
post conviction case. Due to communication difficulties with Mr. Shomloo, we also retained 
Maria Andrade in Idaho to represent Mr. Medina in his immigration matters. Mr. Medina has 
been incarcerated in Tacoma, Washington as a result of the immigration hold since finishing his 
sentence in Sheridan in March of 2011. Although bail was set in July, we have not been able to 
afford Mr. Medina's release. 
8. Throughout this ordeal, Junior and I have been working together to assist Mr. Medina 
in getting information to and from the lawyers. Communication with both attorneys and Mr. 
Medina has been difficult - a situation aggravated by Mr. Medina's multiple moves from various 
detention facilities. We relied on the advice of attorneys that we needed to wait until the re-entry 
case was finished in order to address Mr. Medina's immigration problem. As soon as we 
discovered that the immigration problem was caused by the Idaho conviction, we searched for an 
attorney who could file a post-conviction action. 
9. Based on multiple conversations with Mr. Medina concerning his immigration status 
over the years before his arrest, I do not believe Mr. Medina understood that the fact he had been 
returned to Mexico by immigration officials was a true "deportation" because his green card and 
driver's license were left in his possession. I also do not believe that Mr. Medina has ever 
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understood the effect the Idaho conviction had on his immigration papers. 
This ends my affidavit. 
~~ lheHyRObrts 
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Robyn Fyffe 
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ANNE-MARIE KELSO 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North 
Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
Fax: (208) 642-6099 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, ) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Anne-Marie Kelso, and, submits this supplemental brief. 
In the Petitioners' supplemental memorandum, he argues that the court should hear this 
matter for two reasons: 1) equitable tolling applies and 2) the alleged retroactivity of Padilla v. 
Kentucky 130 S,Ct. 1473 (2010). 
The Petitioner is not entitled to Equitable Tolling 
As noted in the State's original brief, in Idaho, equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations for filing a post-conviction relief petition has only been recognized: (1) where the 
petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and (2) where mental disease and/or 
psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier 
pursuing challenges to his conviction. See Leer v. State 148 Idaho 113 (2009); Shultz v. State 151 
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Idaho 383 (2011); Amboh v. State 149 Idaho 650 (2010). The Petitioner argues he was in fact 
incarcerated out of state. Further, petitioner argues that he brought the motion timely. However, 
the issue of equitable tolling is not contingent upon a reasonable time for filing. Rather, there are 
two instances, as noted, where equitable tolling applies. Petitioner wants this Court to determine 
that he was incarcerated out of state when he realized he had immigration issues. However, 
again as noted in the original brief, the Petitioner has already admitted that he knew in 2000 that 
he had immigrations issues. Furthermore, from the time Padilla was decided, in March 2010 to 
the time the Defendant was arrest, in September 2010, Petitioner was not incarcerated anywhere. 
Therefore, he fails to satisfy the criteria for equitable tolling. 
The Holding Of Padilla Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For Retroactive Application1 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings in which, 
like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. 
State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)). Where the petitioner alleges 
entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner 
"must establish that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in 
prejudice to the claimant." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). "There is a strong presumption 
that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance and the defendant 
bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id. (citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989)). In addition, 
it is well-established that"[ a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
1 The following was taken from, in part, from the brief of the Idaho Attorney General in HASAN ICANOVIC vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Supreme Court Case No. 38477, submitted on or about November 8, 2011. 
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made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time." Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original)). 
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must "show a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148 Idaho at 
570, 225 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998)). "'A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in 
relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and 
citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." 
Padilla at 1485 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
Medina bases a large part of the supplemental brief arguing for the retro activity of Padilla. 
Because the holding of Padilla does not meet the applicable test for retroactive application, Medina 
is not entitled to relief as a matter oflaw. 
1. Overview of Padilla v. Kentucky 
In Padilla, the Court considered whether defense counsel has an obligation to advise his client 
that a guilty plea would make him subject to automatic deportation. Padilla pled guilty to drug 
trafficking in Kentucky state court and, although a lawful permanent resident of the United States, he 
was subject to removal because of his drug conviction. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. Padilla sought 
post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Padilla argued he entered his 
guilty plea in reliance on his counsel's erroneous advice that the plea would not affect his 
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immigration status. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla post-conviction reliefand held 
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not protect him from 
erroneous advice regarding the collateral consequences of a conviction such as deportation or 
removal. Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. It found "constitutionally competent 
counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. The Court noted that many state and federal 
courts had concluded that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
was limited to advice about the direct consequences of a guilty plea, and did not extend to 
information regarding collateral consequences. Id. at 1481. However, it nonetheless concluded that 
"advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel." Id. at 1482. The Court explained that it had "never applied a distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' required under Strickland." Id. at 1481. It declined to consider the appropriateness of the 
direct/collateral distinction generally and found such a distinction to be "ill-suited to evaluating a 
Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation." Id. at 1481-82. 
The Court based its conclusion on the "unique nature" of deportation, and specifically 
focused on its severity as a penalty and its close relationship to the criminal process. Id. at 1481. 
The Court discussed recent changes in federal immigration law and explained that these changes 
further "enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation" by making "removal nearly 
an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders." Id. at 14 78-81. The Court held that 
"deportation is an integral part ... of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes" and cannot be "divorce[ d] ... from the conviction." Id. at 1480-81. 
The Court concluded that Strickland thus applied to Padilla's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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The Court next considered whether Padilla established the first Strickland prong - whether 
his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. In determining the 
reasonableness of Padilla's attorney's representation, the Court looked to the prevailing professional 
norms set forth by the American Bar Association and numerous other authorities. Id. at 1482, 1485. 
The Court found that, dating back to the mid- l 990s, those authorities have been in agreement that 
counsel must advise his client regarding the risks of deportation. Id. It explained that if Padilla's 
counsel consulted the removal statutes he would have easily determined that Padilla's guilty plea 
would make his removal virtually mandatory and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to do 
so. Id at 1483. The Court held, "when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this 
case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear." Id. 
The Court also noted that, although in Padilla's case the immigration consequences were 
clear, in some situations the immigration consequences are unclear. Id. In those situations, defense 
counsel still has a duty to advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may have negative 
immigration consequences. Id. Thus, the Court held that the seriousness and severity of deportation 
as a consequence of a guilty plea make it critical that defense counsel "inform her client whether his 
plea carries a risk of deportation." Id. at 1486. 
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2. Padilla Created A New Rule2 
In collateral proceedings such as post-conviction "Idaho courts must independently review 
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles oflaw under the Teague [ v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989)] standard." Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 136, 233 P.3d 61, 67 (2010). 
Under Teague, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court announcing a new rule apply to 
all criminal cases still pending on direct review. The new rule, however, only applies 
to final convictions in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply 
retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands 
convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces punishment that the 
law cannot impose upon him. New procedural rules generally do not apply 
retroactively because they do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the 
law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted 
with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. This is a 
more speculative connection to innocence and, therefore, retroactivity is only given to 
a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental 
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. 
Id. at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). See also Kriebel v. State, 148 
Idaho 188, 191, 219 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Ct. App. 2009)("If a case is deemed to have announced anew 
rule, it will apply retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the 
2 Courts are split as to whether Padilla announced a new rule and whether the rule should be given 
retroactive effect. To date, three federal circuit courts have addressed the issue, and the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits have concluded that Padilla is a new rule not entitled to retroactive effect. See 
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (ih Cir. 2011); United States v. Chang Hong, --F.3d--, 2011 
WL 3805763 (101h Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit has found that Padilla simply applied the old 
Strickland rule, such that it was retroactively applicable on collateral review. United States v. 
Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640-42 (3rd Cir. 2011). Federal district courts are likewise split. Compare 
Doan v. United States, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2011 WL 116811 at *3 (E.D.Va. 201 l)(Padilla states a new 
rule); United States v. Hough, 2010 WL 5250996 at *3-4 (D.N.J. 2010) (same); United States v. 
Perez, 2010 WL 4643033 at *2 (D.Neb. 2010) (same) with Marroquin v. United States, 2011 WL 
488985 at *2 (S.D.Tex. 2011) (Padilla does not state a new rule); Luna v. United States, 2010 WL 
4868062 at *3-4 (S.D.Cal. 2010) (same); United States v. Shafeek, 2010 WL 3789747 at *3 
(E.D.Mich. 2010) (same); Martin v. United States, 2010 WL 3463949 at *3 (C.D.Ill. 2010) (same); 
Al Kokabani v. United States, 2010 WL 3941836 at *4-6 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (same); United States v. 
Millan, 2010 WL 2557699 at *1 (N.D.Fla. 2010) (same). The state submits the reasoning of the 
courts that have concluded Padilla created a new rule is more persuasive, particularly in light of the 
applicable legal test for determining whether a new rule has been created as discussed irifra. 
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rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of 
the criminal proceedings." (internal quotations omitted)). 
Padilla created a new rule. A rule is new when it was not "dictated by precedent existing at 
the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). 
A rule is old if a "court considering the defendant's claim at the time his conviction became final 
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by 
the Constitution." O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (quotation and brackets omitted). 
The inquiry is whether Padilla's outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). In determining whether the outcome of a case was 
susceptible to reasonable debate, the Supreme Court has looked to both the views expressed in the 
opinion itself and lower court decisions. "If the lower courts were split on the issue, the Court has 
concluded that the outcome of the case was susceptible to reasonable debate." Chaidez v. United 
States, 655 F.3d 384, 2011WL3705173 at *4 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. In 
addition, "[l]ack of unanimity on the Court in deciding a particular case supports the conclusion that 
the case announced a new rule." Chaidez at *4 (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414-15, 124 
S.Ct. 2504 (2004)). 
a. Lower Court Split 
Prior to Padilla, lower courts were split as to whether an attorney must advise his clients of 
deportation consequences. In Chaidez, the Seventh Circuit explained: 
Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts, including at least nine Courts of 
Appeals, had uniformly held that the Sixth Amendment did not require counsel to 
provide advice concerning any collateral (as opposed to direct) consequences of a 
guilty plea. Courts in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia had reached 
this same conclusion. Such rare unanimity among the lower courts is compelling 
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evidence that reasonable jurists reading the Supreme Court's precedents in April 
2004 could have disagreed about the outcome of Padilla. 
Chaidez at * 5 (internal citations and quotes omitted). It continued: 
We acknowledge that the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily 
mean a rule is new. But, in our view, an objective reading of the relevant cases 
demonstrates that Pad ill a was not dictated by precedent. It is true that, unlike so 
many lower courts, the Supreme Court has never applied a distinction between direct 
and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable 
professional assistance as required under Strickland. As such, prior to Padilla, the 
Court had not foreclosed the possibility that advice regarding collateral consequences 
of a guilty plea could be constitutionally required. But neither had the Court required 
defense counsel to provide advice regarding consequences collateral to the criminal 
prosecution at issue. 
Id. at *6 (internal citations and quotes omitted). 
In Idaho, like in the majority of jurisdictions, the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel did not require counsel to provide advice concerning collateral consequences of 
a guilty plea. See Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001). The risk 
of deportation or other impacts on immigration status was generally considered a collateral 
consequence, albeit a "very significant consequence" for a defendant. State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 
Idaho 400, 402, 179 P.3d 363, 365 (Ct. App. 2008); Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 
P.2d 603, 607-608 (Ct. App. 1994). Because the risk of deportation was considered a collateral 
consequence, and an attorney had no duty to advise his clients of collateral consequences, prior to 
Padilla an Idaho attorney had no obligation to advise his clients of possible deportation consequences 
stemming from their guilty pleas. That Idaho followed the majority rule in holding that an attorney 
did not generally need to advise defendants of deportation consequences lends support to the 
argument that the outcome of Padilla was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." 
b. Lack Of Supreme Court Unanimity 
Also weighing in favor of a conclusion that Padilla created a new rule is the lack of 
unanimity on the Court in the Padilla case. See Chaidez at *4. Justice Stevens delivered the 
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majority opinion in Padilla, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. Justice 
Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Roberts joined. Justice Scalia 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. As explained by the Seventh Circuit, this 
lack of unanimity supports the conclusion that Padilla announced a new rule: 
Statements in the concurrence leave no doubt that Justice Alito and Chief Justice 
Roberts considered Padilla to be groundbreaking. See 130 S.Ct. at 1488, 1491, 1492 
(referring to the majority's holding as a "dramatic departure from precedent," "a 
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law," and a "dramatic expansion of the scope of 
criminal defense counsel's duties under the Sixth Amendment"). And the two 
dissenting Justices, who expressed the view that the majority's extension of the 
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence lacked "basis in text or principle," certainly 
did not see Padilla as dictated by precedent. 130 S.Ct. at 1495 (Scalie, J., 
dissenting). See also Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236-37, 110 S.Ct. 2822. Even the majority 
suggested that the rule it announced was not dictated by precedent, stating that while 
Padilla's claim "follow[ ed] from" its decision applying Strickland to advice 
regarding guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d. 
203 (1985), Hill "does not control the question before us." Id. at 1485 n. 12. 
Chaidez at *4 (emphasis original). The Chaidez Court continued: 
It seems evident from Supreme Court precedent that Padilla cannot be an old rule 
simply because existing case law "inform[ed], or even control[led] or govern[ed]," 
the analysis. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257. Nor will the rule of Padilla be 
deemed old because precedent lent "general support" to the rule it established, 
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236, 110 S.Ct. 2822, or because it represents "the most 
reasonable ... interpretation of general law," Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 
538, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997). Padilla can only be considered an old 
rule if Supreme Court precedent "compel[led] the result. Safjle, 494 U.S. at 490, 
110 S.Ct. 1257. The majority's characterization of Hill suggests that it did not 
understand the rule set forth in Padilla to be dictated by precedent. 
Id. (emphasis original). Thus, both the lack of unanimity between members of the Supreme Court 
and the split among lower courts prior to Padilla support the conclusion that Padilla created a new 
rule. 
3. Padilla Does Not Meet Either Of The Exceptions To The Retroactivity Bar 
A new rule will apply retroactively to a final conviction only under limited circumstances. 
Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). "A new rule applies retroactively in collateral 
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proceedings only if (1) the rule is substantive, or (2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings." Whorton 
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quotation and alteration omitted). New substantive rules 
generally apply retroactively because they "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands 
convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot 
impose upon him." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 352). New 
procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively because "[t]hey do not produce a class of 
persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that 
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise." Id. 
(alteration in original). The Rhoades Court explained: 
This is a more speculative connection to innocence and, therefore, retroactivity is 
only given to a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicated the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings. The procedural rule 
must be one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously 
diminished. 
Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
A substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law 
punishes." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 353). A procedural 
rule "regulate[ s] only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability." Id. (emphasis in 
original). The rule in Padilla "regulates the manner in which a defendant arrives at the decision to 
plead guilty." United States v. Chang Hong, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 3805763 at *8 (101h Cir. 2011). An 
individual who knows the full immigration consequences of a guilty plea may choose instead to 
plead not guilty. As such, Padilla created a procedural rule and the retroactivity exception for 
substantive rules does not apply. Id. 
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A procedural rule is only given retroactive effect if the new rule is a watershed rule. 
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two requirements. 
First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an 
inaccurate conviction. Second, the rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Application of this standard shows that Padilla's rule is not "watershed." The Tenth Circuit 
explained: 
Padilla does not concern the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding, 
but instead relates to the deportation consequences of a defendant's guilty plea. The 
rule does not affect the determination of a defendant's guilt and only governs what 
advice defense counsel must render when his noncitizen client contemplates a plea 
bargain. Padilla would only be at issue in cases where the defendant admits guilt and 
pleads guilty. In such situations, because the defendant's guilt is established through 
his own admission - with all the strictures of a Rule 11 plea colloquy - Padilla is 
simply not germane to concerns about the risks of inaccurate convictions or 
fundamental procedural fairness. 
Chang Hong at *9. 
Medina cannot establish that there was "large risk of an inaccurate conviction" under the 
rubric oflaw prior to Padilla. Likewise, having counsel's advice on immigration consequences does 
not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding." Indeed, having that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision 
whether to plead guilty or not. For these reasons, the new rule created in Padilla does not fit either of 
the retroactivity exceptions, and Padilla should not be applied retroactively in collateral proceedings. 
Based thereon, it is respectively re uested that Medina's Petition be summarily 
dismissed. 
DATED this ~ay of Dece 
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Petitioner, CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
vs. AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Ernesto G. Medina, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am the Petitioner in the above-titled case. 
2. I re-affirm the truth of those statements in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
("Petition"), which are within my personal knowledge. Specifically, I re-affirm Paragraphs 8-31. 
3. As described in the Petition, I lawfully emigrated to the United States in 1986 and became a 
legal permanent resident in 1990. My wife, Luz, and our growing family lived in the Ontario, Oregon 
area since coming to the United States. Keeping my green card and being able to continue caring for my 
wife and four children in the Ontario area has been - and is - the most important aspect of my life. I 
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knew that having a clean criminal record was an important part of keeping my green card and was very 
proud of the fact that in all the years I had been in this country, I had only received a ticket for driving 
without a seatbelt in 1990. 
4. One day in 1995, I agreed to give a ride to a person I knew named Roberto, who was married 
to my niece. We went to a store and I bought a drink. On my way to Ontario, I was stopped and 
arrested. I had no idea what was going on and I thought perhaps they thought I had not paid for my 
drink. I later found out I was being accused of delivering drugs. 
5. I could not afford to bond out and my wife became very mentally ill. She was unable to care 
for our children and was taken to the hospital. A friend finally paid for my bond. The people that 
worked in the hospital and for Health and Welfare wanted my wife to go to a place for the mentally ill in 
Pendleton, Oregon, but I convinced them to put her into my care instead. My wife saw doctors who treat 
mental illness and gave her medicine but it did not do her any good. 
6. My charges were dismissed. I was told that there had been an error. 
7. My wife's condition continued to be very bad and we went to Mexico to see if a doctor there 
could help her. We drove from Ontario to Colima, Mexico, where Luz saw a doctor who gave her 
medicine. After two months, we returned to Ontario and she continued her treatment with the doctors 
there. 
8. I obtained work at the Amour meat packing plant in Nampa. One day I was called to the 
office and arrested. I had no idea why. My attorney, David Posey, told me that I was being accused of 
delivering drugs again and I told him that they were confused and there must be a mistake. 
9. I desperately wanted out of jail so that I could help my wife, who continued to be very ill and 
had a great deal of difficulty coping with my incarceration. Mr. Posey told me that ifl pled guilty, I 
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could get out of jail and I would have to serve an additional 22 days in jail during which I would be 
allowed to leave during the day to work. As also described in the Petition, I asked Mr. Posey whether 
pleading guilty would effect my immigration papers. As I have said, I had a very clean record and 
keeping my papers and green card was the most important thing to me. Mr. Posey told me that he was 
sure I would not have problems with my papers if I pied guilty. Mr. Posey told me that in three months, 
he would submit a request to clear my record and that it would then be clean again. Mr. Posey assured 
me several times that there would be no problem with my papers if I pied guilty. I relied on this advice 
in accepting the plea deal described in the Petition. I was not guilty of delivery of drugs but since Mr. 
Posey told me there would be no problem with my papers and my record and my wife was very sick, I 
decided the best thing to do was to plead guilty. 
I 0. After reporting to serve my sentence, I spent six days sleeping in the jail and leaving at 5:00 
a.m. and returning at 10 p.m. The next day, I was not allowed to leave because immigration had come 
for me. I said there was a mistake because Mr. Posey had said there would be no problem. I was ·not 
allowed to call Mr. Posey before immigration came for me. 
11. I spent approximately three months in a detention facility in Arizona, during which time I 
went to an immigration court approximately two times. I did not have an attorney, there were a lot of 
people and the officials talked very fact. I did not understand what happened. I was taken to the border 
in a vehicle with other people and sent across the border. Immigration had taken the green cards and 
licenses of other people who I know who were deported. I thought perhaps there was a mistake after all 
and that my immigration papers were still good. This belief was re-affirmed when I presented the green 
card at the border and was permitted to enter the United States. 
12. I returned to the Ontario area and continued working and supporting my family. Then one 
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day in September, 2010, I was arrested at work. At first I thought perhaps I was arrested because I had 
not renewed my green card. I spent four or five days in Mountain Home and was then taken to 
Pendeleton, Oregon, where I stayed only about forty minutes. I spent a night in The Dalles, Oregon, and 
then a few hours in Portland, Oregon. I was then taken to Tacoma, Washington, where I stayed four 
days and then to Sheridan, Oregon, where I remained for 167 days. I came to understand that I had been 
charged with illegally re-entering the United States. 
13. Finally, in January, 2011, I was told that the problem with my immigration papers was the 
conviction from Payette, Idaho, and that I needed to find an attorney to do a post-conviction petition in 
Idaho. The Idaho attorneys who were hired to help me, Ms. Fyffe and Maria Andrade, explained to me 
that the Idaho conviction is an "aggravated felony" that means my green card can never be renewed. 
Although I began to suspect there was a problem with my green card before my arrest, I never 
understood that the advice Mr. Posey gave me was completely false. 
This ends my affidavit. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before ~-'71:_ of JJ""-"-'"" 4-
Notary Public for the State of Washington 
Residing at: ------'-------'---'--
My commission expires: ____ _ 
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That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
That I am counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned case. 
That I am conversant in the Spanish language. 
Mr. Medina is presently being detained in the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma, 
Washington. It takes several weeks to receive a document that I send to Mr. Medina to be 
reviewed and notarized. 
I drafted the instant Affidavit based on information that Mr. Medina provided to me in a 
letter written in Spanish. I thereafter reviewed the contents of this Affidavit with Mr. 
Medina by telephone and he affirmed that the contents therein are true and correct. 
I mailed the foregoing Affidavit in order to obtain Mr. Medina's notarized signature. 
However, I anticipate it will be several weeks before the signed Affidavit arrives via U.S. 
mail. 
I wil I file the notarized Affidavit up~_,_~re'-c-e~i"'-------------­
Robyn Fyffe 
5 • AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thisZ °Zuay of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 




to: Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
********** 
THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE 
COURT REPORTER: Leda Waddle 
DATE: January 6, 2012 
Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2011-0000319 
Court Minutes 
Time: 1:38-1:50 p.m. 
Courtroom #1 
This being the time and place set for the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, present before the Honorable Susan E. Wiebe were Robyn 
Fyffe attorney on behalf of the plaintiff and Anne Marie Kelso, 
prosecuting attorney on behalf of the State. 
Ms. Fyffe presented argument. 
Ms. Kelso replied. 
The Court gave ruling and granted the defendant's motion to 
dismiss. The State was ordered to prepare the appropriate order. 
Court was adjourned. 






Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
1130 Third Avenue North 
Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
(208) 642-6096 
(208) 642-6099 (facsimile) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) I 
) j Case No.: CV2011-319 
) 






This matter came on for hearing on the Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal on the 61h day of January, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. Based upon the evidence and 
argument presented, the Respondent's Motion is GRANTED and this matter is hereby 
DISMISSED. 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which 
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
J'-1 
I 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this (;;> day of January, 2012. 
L[~G__J_ 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
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P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
U.S. Mail _x __ Facsimile 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
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CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Ernesto Medina, through his attorney Robyn Fyffe, asks the Court to reconsider its order 
summarily dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely. This Motion is brought 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B), which allows the Court to reconsider any 
interlocutory order upon a motion made within fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment, and is 
supported by the contemporaneously filed memorandum of counsel. 
Respectfully submitted thid7 day of January, 2012. 
cKA Y & BARTLETT LLP 
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CASE NO. CV-2011-319 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 2012, the Court granted the state's motion to dismiss Mr. Medina's petition 
for post-conviction relief as untimely and entered final judgment on the state's behalf on January 
13. 2012. Relying on federal circuit precedent, the Court determined that Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) announced a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and that 
Mr. Medina was therefore not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations or the 
benefit of the Padilla decision. 
As described more fuHy below, the Court's application of the Teague standard was 
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's mandate that Idaho courts independently review requests 
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for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of law. The Court should therefore 
reconsider the dismissal of Mr. Medina's petition and schedule an evidentiary hearing. 
H. ARGUMENT 
Padilla's holding falls within the confines of prior United States Supreme Court 
precedent and is therefore a retroactively applicable "old rule" under the Teague doctrine. 
Further, the limitation period for Mr. Medina to file his post-conviction relief petition did not 
begin to run until Padilla was announced because Padilla corrected Idaho's unreasonable 
understanding of the scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and tolling 
is necessary in order to provide Mr. Medina with a meaningful opportunity to present his claim. 
Even if Padilla announced a new rule under Teague, the principles underlying that rule are of 
such significant import that fundamental fairness requires that the opinion be given retroactive 
effect and that the statute of limitation begin to run anew when the opinion was announced. 
Because Mr. Medina filed his petition within one year of Padilla, it was timely and the Court 
should deny the state's motion to dismiss. 
In determining otherwise, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in United 
States v. Chang Hong, Dock. No. 10-6294, _F.3d __ , 2011 WL 3805763, 5 (10th Cir. 
2011). This wholesale adoption of federal circuit precedent was contrary to Rhoades v. State, 
149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010), which requires Idaho courts to apply the Teague doctrine 
independently of federal jurisprudence and consistent with considerations unique to our state. 
Moreover, the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our jurisprudence dictate that 
Padilla is a retroactively applicable old rule. Even if a new rule, concerns including our state's 
expansive right to counsel and salient differences between co1Jateral review under the UP CPA 
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and federal habeas establish that the Padilla opinion announced a watershed rule. This Court 
should therefore reconsider the dismissal of this action, set aside the judgment and set the matter 
for an evidentiary hearing. 
A. Padilla is an Old Rule Under the Modified Teague Approach Adopted by Rhoades 
Although the Rhoades Court adopted the Teague approach to determine whether United 
States Supreme Court decisions should be given retroactive effect, it noted that federal courts 
have "strictly interpreted Teague to avoid excessive interference by federal habeas courts in state 
criminal convictions that have become final." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70. 
Because "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity when interpreting whether a 
decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of applying Teague," Idaho courts need not 
"blindly foJlow" the United States Supreme Court's view of what constitutes a new ru]e or 
whether a new rule is a watershed rule. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70, citing 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). Accordingly, Rhoades held that: 
The decisions of the courts of this state whether to give retroactive effect to a rule 
oflaw should reflect independent judgment, based upon the concerns of this Court 
and the "uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing 
jurisprudence." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 (2001) (noting 
that when this Court has found that the Idaho Constitution provides greater 
protection than the U.S. Constitution, it has done so, .. on the uniqueness of our 
state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence'). 
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70. 
In adopting Chang Hong, this Court did not analyze whether the Tenth Circuit's opinion 
reflected the concerns unique to Idaho. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit was largely persuaded that 
Padilla was a "new" rule because many jurisdictions - including its own- had relied on the 
collateral versus direct consequence distinction. Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court does not 
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treat the fact that the newly announced decision ovenules prior precedent as dispositive in 
determining whether the decision articulates a new rule or an old rule applied to a new set of 
facts. For example, in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) the Idaho 
Supreme Court found that it had clarified its standard of review while adhering to the historic 
principles underlying Idaho's harm]ess error and fundamental error doctrines and had not 
announced a new rule even though the opinion itself overruled prior case law. Id. at 227-228. 
Given that Padilla clearly applies long-standing principles concerning the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, there is little to lend itself to the conclusion that the opinion 
announced a new rule other than the number of lower court decisions it overruled. Minnesota -
which applies a similar retroactivity analysis to that adopted by our Supreme Court in Rhoades -
rejected the "temptation" to conclude that Padilla announced a new rule because the opinion 
effectively overruled the "collateral consequences" label that many state and federal courts have 
given to the risk of deportation. Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 569-570 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2011); see also Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136, 233 P.3d at 67 (adopting the Teague standard and 
following "the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court" by holding "that Idaho courts must 
independently review requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of law 
under the Teague standard". The Campos Court reasoned that "'the rule of criminal procedure at 
issue embodies the constitutional entitlement to effective representation," which is examined 
under Strickland, and "a detense attorney's duty to properly advise his client before a guilty plea 
is hardly new." Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 570. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of precedent 
relying on the collateral consequences label, the Campos Court held: 
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Given (1) the procedural posture of Padilla (a collateral attack on a guilty plea); 
(2) the clear references in the opinion to its application to collateral proceedings 
attacking guilty pleas; (3) the analysis under long-standing principles of the right 
to effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the absence of any mention of 
retroactivity, the conclusion that the opinion does not announce a new rule of 
criminal procedure seems self-evident to this court. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
--, 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (stating "[i]n this postconviction proceeding ... "); 
1485-86 (discussing "nature of relief secured by a successful collateral chaHenge 
to a guilty plea" and "collateral challenge to a conviction"). 
Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 570; see also Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903 (Mass. 
2011) (noting that Padilla effectively changed the law in nine circuits but reasoning that the mere 
existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new and holding that the 
Padilla analysis was "the definitive application of an established constitutional standard on a 
case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving professional nonns ... to new facts"). 
Like Minnesota, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes the intimate relation between a 
guilty plea in a criminal case and the immigration consequences that may flow therefrom. The 
Idaho Supreme Court amended LC.R. 11 in 2007 to require that district courts "inform all 
defendants that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making 
of factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain 
legal citizenship in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship." 
I.C.R. 11 ( d)(l ). Idaho's establishment of this requirement as part of the entry of plea process 
pre-dates the issuance of the Padilla Opinion and reflects our state's judgment as to the integral 
relation between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration consequences flowing therefrom. See 
also Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570 (recognizing the pre-existing requirement for a trfal court 
to advise a defendant regarding potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea as an 
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indicator that the Padilla opinion was not a "'new rule" under Minnesota's independent Teague 
analysis). 
Notwithstanding Idaho's categorization of immigration consequences of "collateral," our 
Court of Appeals has recognized the intimate connection between a guilty plea and the resulting 
deportation consequences. See State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402, 179 P.3d 363, 365 
(Ct. App. 2008). In State v. Tinoco-Perez, the Court indicated: 
Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is 
generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction, it is 
nevertheless a very significant consequence for the defendant. Indeed, for many 
non-citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will be quite 
secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on the defendant's life and 
future. Therefore, the effect on immigration status is an appropriate consideration 
for the trial court in fashioning a sentence or considering Rule 35 relief. 
Id. Idaho's recognition of the critical importance of immigration consequences to guilty pleas for 
non citizen defendants suggests that our state should recognize that the rule in Padilla is not 
'"new." 
The weight Idaho courts assign to the standards articulated by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) for "The Defense Function" to measure contemporary standards for 
competency of counsel also sets our state apart. In discussing the right to competent counsel 
under Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "As a 
beginning point to this inquiry, this Court recognized the American Bar Association's standards 
entitled 'The Defense Function.'" Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 635 (1986). The ABA 
standards for defense counsel and for the conduct of criminal proceedings have often been 
referred to as "the starting point" under our Idaho State Constitution in evaluating claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279-280 (1998); 
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Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8-9 (1975); Murphy v. 
State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 411 (Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1981 ). 
As noted by the Padilla Court, the American Bar Association recognized the necessity of 
competent defense counsel to advise a non-citizen defendant of the immigration consequences of 
his or her plea prior to its Opinion. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; see also I.NS. v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001). Because Idaho places special emphasis on the American Bar 
Association's promulgated standards in determining our own state constitutional right to counsel, 
and because these standards recognized the necessity of competent counsel to advise a client 
regarding immigration consequences of a conviction before Padilla, our unique jurisprudence 
dictates that Padilla is not a "'new rule" under our independent state review for retroactivity. 
In concluding that Padilla announced a new rule, the Tenth Circuit relied on the number 
of courts that had applied the collateral versus direct consequence distinction to define the scope 
of counsel's duties that was rejected by Padilla. This particular factor has been given little 
weight in Idaho and our state's unique jurisprudence thus dictates against adopting the Tenth 
Circuit's analysis. Further, Idaho has long recognized the importance of immigration 
consequences of guilty pleas for non citizen defendants, notwithstanding its erroneous 
application of the direct consequence limitation on the scope of counsel's duties. Accordingly, 
the independent Teague analysis required by Rhoades dictates that Padilla announced a 
retroactively applicable old rule. 
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Even if Padilla Articulated a New Rule, Fundamental Fairness Requires Retroactive 
Application of the Critical Constitutional Safeguard Announced in That Opinion 
As noted above, the Rhoades Court followed Minnesota's lead and declined to adopt a 
reflexive application of Teague with regard to the meaning of the retroactivity standards at issue. 
In explaining the importance of independent review with regard to state post-conviction claims,. 
the Court noted that the Teague approach has been criticized for imposing an overly broad 
definition of a new rule that excluded most decisions concerning constitutional questions and for 
defining the two exceptions providing for retroactive application of new rules in an extremely 
narrow manner. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138, 233 P.3d at 69. The Rhoades Court also 
acknowledged that the primary motivator for strict application of the Teague standards under 
federal law was concerns against excessive interference by federal courts in state law 
determinations and that "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity when interpreting 
whether a decision pronounces a new rule oflaw for purposes of applying Teague." Id. at 139, 
233 P.3d at 70. Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was, 
"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newly-announced 
principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, and our 
long-standingjurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140. 
Important differences between collateral review under the UPCP A and federal habeas 
establish that a narrow definition of what constitutes a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure is 
unwarranted. Further, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes an expansive right to counsel and 
that adequate advise regarding immigration consequences is the most important aspect of the 
decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, independent application of the Teague exceptions to 
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retroactive application of new rules in light of concerns unique to Idaho establisl1 that Padilla 
announced a watershed rule. 1 
a. Idaho's unique jurisprudence under the Idaho Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act requires a lesser standard for watershed rules with regard f() 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such daims generally may 
not be brought on direct appeal 
In Idaho, ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally must be brought through a 
collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCP A), rather than being 
raised on direct appeal. Therefore, the concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal 
standard for watershed rules do not apply and this Court should apply a lesser standard for what 
constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas corpus review pursuant to 
Teague. 
In Rhoades, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that federal courts have interpreted the 
exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court has found no watershed 
rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139. This narrow 
application reflects concerns specific to the federal habeas corpus context, and concomitant 
concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the finality of state court 
decisions. Teague~ 489 U.S. at 308-310. Federal habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute 
for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing the merits of cdminal trials,' but only 'to guard against 
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems."' Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 
(1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)). 
1 As discussed in Mr. Medina's supplemental memorandum in opposition to the state's 
summary dismissal motion, Padilla's status as a "watershed" rule signifies that the statute of 
limitations began to run anew when the opinion was announced fo addition to establishing the 
opinion's retroactivity. Supplemental Memorandum, p. 4, 11-16. 
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In fact, the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal 
habeas. See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975). This requirement presupposes 
that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will have already obtained a 
ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state appellate courts from which his or 
her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490. 
In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the unique nature of federal habeas 
corpus review may lead states to apply a lesser standard of review for retroactivity and that the 
unique nature of federal habeas corpus review prompted the standards underpinning the Teague 
analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the rule it established was 
tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States 
could provide broader relief in their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that 
opinion." Danforth, 552 U.S. at 277. In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so 
squarely the product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of 
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of comity 
might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader application of 
precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280. 
Idaho's unique jurisprudence regarding colJateral challenges to criminal convictions 
under the UPCPA does not share in any of the salient features of collateral challenges under 
federal habeas that have motivated federal courts to apply such rigid and incredibly narrow 
standards for a watershed rule for purposes ofretroactivity. This is particularly the case with 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which normally cannot be brought on direct review 
and must instead be brought through post-conviction. 
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In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel either on 
direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both. Matthews v. State, 122 
Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory, raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is that resolution of such claims 
almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal, and therefore expansion of the record 
through post-conviction is usuaJly required in order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., 
State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551-552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985); 
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct. 
App. 2000); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 124 
Idaho 374, 375-376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to 
entertain c1aims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal. 
Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549-550; 
]vfitchell, 124 Idaho at 376. 
The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a petition for 
post-conviction relie:f, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the alleged deficiency relates 
directly to the private consu1tation occurring between an attorney and client regarding the 
decision whether to plead guilty. See Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requiring development outside the trial record typically include 
fasues as to ''the adequacy of counsel's communications with the defendant"). Under Idaho's 
unique post-conviction jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through 
collateral attacks in post-conviction, rather than on direct review, because they hinge on 
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evidentiary matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for justiciability 
of such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as that present in federal habeas corpus -
rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior proceedings in order to properly exhaust 
state remedies, these issues of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised in any 
proceeding other than a post-conviction petition under Idaho law. 
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue under 
federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior opportunity to 
litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction are a defendant's first 
and sole state mechanism to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described 
in Padilla, such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to 
be deemed a watershed rule. 
b. Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to our more expansive state 
statutory right to counsel requires a lesser standard for watershed rules with 
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is only 
guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique jurisprudence provides a 
right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided solely under the federal constitution, 
and therefore reflects a heightened concern for protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law 
than inheres under the federal constitution. 
In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho 
State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the assistance of counsel 
by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho, a criminal defendant has the 
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right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person having his mvn counsel is so entitled," 
and is further entitled to the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most 
circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852, 19-4904. Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment 
of counsel grants an indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in 
which retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282 
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel to 
appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance." Id. at 282; 
see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). That Idaho provides a more expansive 
right to counsel is also reflected by the fact that Idaho recognizes the right to counsel in order to 
pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme Court - a right that was 
expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court. Compare 
Hernandez, 127 Idaho 687-688; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-616 (1974). 
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under our 
statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 
See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is quite significant with 
regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel, as the right to cotmsel in 
post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-556 (1987). 
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is in place by statute 
in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does not require the appointment 
of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an affluent defendant may retain one for the 
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proceeding in question. Id. at 556. "The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the 
legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to 
reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to 
present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." Id. Thus, the federal 
standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than that afforded to defendants by 
statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains no guarantee that an indigent defendant 
has the same right to the representation of counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such 
a right by operation of LC.§ 19-852. See also Young, 122 ldaho at 281-282. Moreover, the 
statutory right to counsel carries the right to that counsel's assistance be effective as does the 
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 
685, 687 (1995) ("statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the 
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel"). 
That fundamental fairness which requires recognition of Padilla as a watershed rule is 
illustrated by this case. Like many non-citizen defendants, the "term of imprjsonment imposed 
by the court [was] quite secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on [Mr. Medina's] 
life and future.'~ See Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho at 402, 179 P .3d at 365. Based entirely on his 
attorney's repeated assurances that the guilty plea would not effect his immigration status, Mr. 
Medina entered an Alford plea and accepted the judgment of the court notwithstanding his 
assertion ofinnocence. As previously noted, if Mr. Medina had entered a guilty plea two weeks 
earlier- before April l, 1997 - he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the 
prior version of the law. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326 (ho1ding that discretionary relief from 
deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April 
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1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and 
who, notvvithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of 
their plea under the law then in effect). In electing to extend relief, the St. Cyr Court noted that 
"competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides," would advise 
clients regarding important immigration consequences of a guilty plea. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 
n.50. However, Mr. Medina's attorney provided affirmatively misleading advice and Mr. 
Medina's Alford plea resulted in permanent exile. This situation illustrates how procedural 
safeguards to prevent convictions being gained through reliance on such materially inaccurate 
information is critical to the concept of ordered liberty. 
Idaho's broader right to counsel, in addition to the absence of comity and similar 
concerns that have resulted in a very narrow application of the Teague exceptions to retroactivity, 
dictate that Idaho courts be less stringent in their wi1Iingness to recognize that a new rule is a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure. Further, as discussed above, Idaho has long-recognized the 
significance of adequate advice for non citizen defendants and has recognized a heightened right 
to counsel. Accordingly, even if Padilla set forth a new rule under Teague, this Court should 
recognize the opinion as announcing a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reconsider its previous order summarily 
dismissing Mr. Medina's petition as untimely and set this matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
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Respectfully submitted th~ 7 day of January, 2012. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, 
the Payette County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Ernesto Gutierrez-Medina, appeals against the above 
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and Order dismissing 
Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, entered in the above entitled action on the 13 1h day 
of January, 2012, the Honorable Susan E. Wiebe, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( a)(l) 
I.AR. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
1 • NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Medina's petition 
for post-conviction relief as untimely? 
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions 
of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
• Oral Argument on the State's Motion to Dismiss, held on 1/6112. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included by Rule 28, I.AR: 
• 3/23/2011 Petitioner's Request that the Court take Judicial Notice; 
• 4114/2011 Verification of Petitioner; 
• 9/22/2011 Affidavit of Anne Marie Kelso in Support of Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Disposition; 
912212011 Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum in 
Support Thereof; 
• 912212011 Notice of Hearing for Motion for Summary Disposition; 
11/10/2011 Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal; 
11110/2011 Affidavit of Counsel; 
11/17/2011 Reply to Objection for Motion for Summary Dismissal; 
11/18/2011 Court Minutes; 
• 12/09/2011 Affidavit of Shelly Roberts; 
12/09/2011 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal; 
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12/09/2011 Affidavit of Petitioner; 
12/09/2011 Affidavit of Kristin Brown; 
12/09/2011 Affidavit of Ernesto Medina Jr.; 
12/13/2011 Supplemental Brief; 
12/23/2011 Affidavit of Petitioner; 
1/06/2012 Court Minutes; 
1/27/2012 Motion to Reconsider; and 
• 1/27/2012 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
(a) n/a. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: Leda Waddle, Court Reporter, Payette County Courthouse, 1130 3rd Ave., 
Rm. 104, Payette, ID 83661. 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
he is indigent. A Motion to Appoint the State Appellate Public Defender on 
Appeal has been filed. 
( c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because he is indigent. 
( d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is 
no filing fee for an appeal of post-conviction petitions. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1 ), Idaho 
Code). 
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ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
The Court, having considered petitioner's motion for an order appointing the Office of 
the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and good cause appearing, 
HEREBY APPOINTS the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Mr. Gutierrez-Medina 
from the final Order and Judgment entered in this case on January 13, 2012. 
-r-
D A TED this~ day of February, 2012. 
l 
j\ ·;,.,,...._ __ 
Hon. Susan E. Wiebe 
District Judge 
1 •ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
/"7 L 
, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Payette County, Idaho 
BETTY J. DRESSEN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND £
1 B ,t.M~ 2012 P.M. 
THIRD JUDICI DISTRICT OF(l,l.i 




CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-2011-319 
SUPREME COURT 
Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette, County, 
Honorable Susan E. Wiebe, presiding. 
Case Number from court: District Court: CV-2011-310 
Order or judgment appealed from: JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT filed on 
January 13, 2012. 
Attorney for Appellant: Defendant: Molly Huskey State Appellant 
Public Def ender 
Attorney for Respondent: State of Idaho, Attorney General 
Appealed by: Robyn Fyffe 
Appealed Against: The State of Idaho 
Notice of Appeal Filed: February 10, 2012 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Amended Notice of Cross Appeal Filed: 
~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Appellate Fee Paid: No. Post-Conviction Relief Appeal 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record 
filed: 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional Reporter's 
Transcript filed 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? YES 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL page-1-
/b</ 
If so Name of Reporter: Leda Waddle 
DATE: February 14, 2012 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL page-2-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-2011-319 
SUPREME COURT # 39672 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Payette do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the 
Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
Exhibit No. Description Admitted Ruling Reserved 
NO TRIAL EXHIBITS 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
EXHIBITS TO THE RECORD: 
1 . Transcript' s on Appeal 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
seal of the said Court at Payette, Idaho, 
and affixed the 
day of 
'1\tlo.rW I 20/~• 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -1 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-2011-319 
SUPREME COURT # 39672 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause will be 
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the 
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits 
identified in the Reporter's Transcript, the following will be 
submitted as a confidential exhibit to the Record on Appeal: 
NO EXHIBITS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this /.)7-+:J:._ day of 
':YY\wc.t> , 2 o 1L . 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
By l!A\_ 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE -1 
I l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-2011-319 
SUPREME COURT # 39672 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of 
the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the 
parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
SARA THOMAS 
State Appellate 
Public Def ender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 





P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for: 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date 
of service of the appeal record to file any objections, together 
with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no 
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be 
filed with the Supreme Court. 
If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will 
serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon 
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating 
which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed 
in seven (7) days, I will serve the party whose name appears 
first in the case title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this f17~ day of 
1V1 OO=C.Jr\ ' 2 0 J_2::::_ . 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
By (11\""' 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1 
